Topics Religion

Question I've just listened to a BBC radio discussion of the ontological argument. I'm puzzled as to why the following objection was not even mentioned: - The concept of "something than which nothing greater can be conceived" necessarily includes the attributes of being all good and all powerful. Something all good and all powerful would not allow suffering. Suffering exists, therefore the concept cannot exist in reality. The counter-argument that suffering is part of God's plan for us to work out our own salvation only reinforces the original objection by admitting that God is not great enough to come up with a better plan. This argument is well known in philosophy in general, so why would it not be considered relevant to the validity of the ontological argument? God may still exist, but if He can't be all good and all powerful, the ontological argument for His existence is a non-starter. I had the impression from the radio programme that the ontological argument is still entertained by some philosophers. How do they get round this objection?

Accepted:
October 4, 2012

Comments

I am probably the only one on the panel who does defend the ontological argument, so I suppose I better reply! There are various versions of the ontological argument, in fact one version (that one can find in the work of Spinoza) does not at all rule out suffering as part of reality and, indeed, Spinoza's God is not theistic and so not purposive. But that aside, I accept a version of the ontological argument that is theistic (God is essentially good, omnipotent, omniscient, necessarily existing, and the like) and so I do need to face up to the problem of evil. Two things to consider: first, the ontological argument (at least the one I accept you can find a version in my book Philosophy of Religion; A Beginner's Guide and on the free online Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy entry "Philosophy of Religion works from the possibility that God exists, to the conclusion that God necessarily exists. Now, if you think the evils in this world show that it is impossible that there is the God of theism, then the argument will not go through. But if you allow that it is at least possible that there is such a God, then the argument has some force (in my view). Second, there are dozens of options that theists have historically and today explored in addressing the problem of evil. I cannot hope to even scratch the surface of these positions in this reply. So, again, I must point you to the Encyclopedia for references and positions. But the second point I would like to underscore is that virtually all philosophies of the cosmos need to address suffering, why people and animals suffer and how should we respond. I am currently co-editing a six volume work (with Chad Meister) on the HIstory of Evil involving about 140 philosophers (and historians with philosophical interests / training) from around the world for Acumen Press. It is scheduled for publication in 2014. As an open-minded theist who believes in both evil and God (or, putting it differently, I believe that evil exists and believe in a trust-worthy God), I am keenly interested in seeing how all the work currently being done by these scholars turns out. Does secular humanism or theism or non-thieistic Buddhism or Hinduism or idealism or materialism...... do better or worse in addressing the nature and prevalence of evil? I believe this to be a deep question and without an obvious answer, but I think it is deeply important for us as we think about the state of the world, our own responsibilities for good or evil, and the ways in which theism or naturalism or some other view more adequately accounts for (and perhaps makes us more resolved to overturn) evil. I see it as very important that we do not treat the "problem of evil" as merely or only an intellectual matter: but a matter calling for responsible action as well as philosophical wisdom.

True confessions: like Charles, I accept the Ontological Argument. But it must be said that a response to the Argument based on "the problem of evil" is something of a mistake. The reason is that the problem of evil is a problem for all arguments for theism, and offers nothing specific for us to learn about the ontological argument, particularly its logic, which is where almost all the interesting issues are.