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Suppose Jane, while growing up, somehow learned the wrong meaning for the word "migraine," and came to believe that any particularly strong headache, regardless of whether it occurred on one or both sides of the head, was a migraine - i.e. that "migraine" and "headache" were mostly synonymous terms. Suppose Jane then has what we would call a headache, a severely painful sensation in her head distributed across both sides of her head, and tells us "I have a migraine." According to her understanding of the term "migraine," her statement is true, but according to her community's differing understanding of the term, her statement is false (because we call them migraines only if they affect one side of the head only). Is there a hierarchy between the contexts in which we can understand her claim? Is her claim ultimately either true or false, or is its truth-value ambiguous?
Accepted:
August 16, 2012

Comments

Charles Taliaferro
August 19, 2012 (changed August 19, 2012) Permalink

This is the sort of question that has vexed many in philosophy of language (Hilary Putnam, Tyler Burge, Lynne Baker, etc). Actually, in my dictionary "migraine" designates the pain as "usually confined to one crania" as opposed to always being so confined. But let's assume the public definition is more restrictive. Philosophers who are sometimes called 'externalists' locate meaning primarily in terms of social discourse. On this view, Jane has said something false. Philosophers (like me) who are sometimes called 'internalists' tend to think of meaning in terms of the speaker's intention. On this view, what she meant to say is true, though the words she used simply failed to identify what the public thinks she is referring to.

To feel some of the intuitive appeal of internalism, imagine a man walks into a room where he sees a group of women and some female dogs. He does not know English very well, but he does know that "bitch" refers to female dogs. He says: "Look at all those great bitches!' One might naturally think he insulted those present by using a crude / derogatory term for female humans, but once he explains (in shock) that he had only meant to draw our attention to some amazing, large female dogs, would we still think he has committed an insult? I suspect he would get a laugh and possibly make some new friends...

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Eddy Nahmias
August 20, 2012 (changed August 20, 2012) Permalink

What a great title for a new book on the internalism/externalism debate in semantics:

"Are Migraines Just in the Head?"

Also, for a more externalist-friendly response, see this recent question: http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/4771

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