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Language

Most words function properly because we more or less agree on what they mean. I can say "chair" and you will most likely have a good idea of what I am talking about. There are other terms, however, where people seem to squabble quite a bit about what a term actually means - like "art", "personhood", "fairness", etc. My question is: Can such terms be useful even if there are several opposing interpretations of what they mean? How? No doubt the debate itself is informative, but if we don't have a clear understanding of what "art" means, I wonder how useful it is to talk about the qualities of art, the study of art, or whether something counts as art. So how useful are terms where people can't agree on a concrete meaning? When does a term become too vague or disputed to be useful?
Accepted:
March 22, 2012

Comments

Andrew Pessin
March 22, 2012 (changed March 22, 2012) Permalink

Great question, though I might worry that words like "useful" are about as vague as any of those in your examples, and thus your question may suffer from the same problems! ... I like your point that "the debate itself is informative" -- assuming that's true, which seems plausible, why couldn't that be "useful" enough? We learn an awful lot about our own concepts and beliefs when we grapple over what constitutes a person, or a work of art, or fairness ... So I'm a bit curious why, after recognizing that as a value for even these vague terms, you seem to demand something significantly more. Perhaps you would like these terms to take on refined and precise meanings like those in natural science, at least paradigmatically -- but then again, these terms DO often take on such precision, at least once they're in the hands of philosophers debating the issues. Bertrand Russell has a nice bit where he observes that if scientists are entitled to develop their own terminology and refine ordinary words to make them "useful to science," then philosophers should do the same .... But then, lastly, one more point: even if the examples you mention don't have "clear" or "precise" or "agreed upon" semantic boundaries, all of them seem to display the archetypal properties of vague terms: they have central, "clear" cases, at the same time as they lack clear peripheral borders. (eg "tall" "mountain" -- Mt Everest is definitely a mountain, even if we can't say precisely when smaller things stop being mountains ...) ... So perhaps the primary "usefulness" of such expressions comes from the agreed upon "central" cases, and then the other kind of "usefulness" comes from the informative debate about the boundaries?

hope THAT is useful ... :-)

ap

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