Topics Philosophers

Question Dear Philosophers, I'm currently reading an excerpt from Descartes' Meditations, specifically the part where he attempts to prove the existence of god. I found myself unable to properly understand his notions of 'formal' reality or truth as compared to 'objective' reality or truth. The fact that an idea appears to him as something specifically, does not mean that it IS that something in reality (it might be merely appearance). However, taken purely in itself, at least the mental representation of the idea is real. Is the former here what Descartes continues to denote with 'objective' reality and the latter 'former' reality, or the other way around? Every time I think I have it figured out what these two terms mean, he uses them in a confusing manner two sentences later. Please help! Sadly, I'm reading an (undoubtedly terrible) translation which does not contain original page numbers; I hope you are able to answer my question without these as reference! Thanks in advance, and with regards, Paul

Accepted:
February 9, 2012

Comments

Not having the text in front of me, I may not be the best guide, but I believe that there are two parts to the argument. One is what might be called a reality principle. There cannot be more reality in the effect than in the cause; the idea of God is the idea of a perfect being and it is unreasonable to believe that the cause of this idea may be something less perfect (ourselves or, more specifically, our minds. Descartes also holds that the idea of existence and and the idea of God are inseparable --like the idea of a mountain and valley. God, then (if God exists) exists necessarily and not contingently. Given that God's existence is possible and hence not impossible, it follows that God exists necessarily. It may sound bizarre, but I actually think the later is a good argument and defend it several places, e.g. Evidence and Faith (Cambridge University Press) and Philosophy of Religion; A Beginner's Guide (UK: OneWorld Press).

'Formal' reality is a measure of the amount of perfection a thing actually has. Every existing thing has some formal reality, and the quantity of this reality depends on the kind of thing it is. (Putting it in traditional -- though not altogether Cartesian -- terms, it depends on its form). God, if he exists at all, will have infinite formal reality, because the essence of God is to be an infinitely perfect being. Created substances will have considerably less formal reality than God, because it is in their nature to be contingent, dependent beings, limited and temporal, all of which connotes a degree of imperfection. And modes of those substances will have less still, because they are dependent not only on God but also on the substances whose modes they are.

'Objective' reality, meanwhile, only pertains to certain kinds of thing, namely those that have representational content. This might be a physical representation, e.g. a painting or a verbal description; or it might be a mental representation, i.e. an idea. And a representation's objective reality is equated with the formal reality of the object that it represents (or at least purports to represent, in cases where the object might not exist at all). An idea of a horse, for instance, has as much objective reality as an actual horse has formal reality. And an idea of a unicorn has as much objective reality as a unicorn would have formal reality if only it existed.

Now, that particular equation, between the objective reality of the representation and the formal reality of its object, is simply built into the definition of what Descartes means by 'objective reality'. But then Descartes proposes another, much more contentious link between objective reality and formal reality. He maintains that the cause of a representation must have at least as much formal reality as the representation itself has objective reality. And this is the principle that the argument of the Third Meditation hinges on. At this stage in the book, Descartes might not be certain of much else, but he is at least certain that his own mind exists, together with the various ideas that it contains. He doesn't yet know whether these ideas correspond to anything real beyond himself: but he does at least know that he has the ideas themselves. And, among these ideas, he finds that he has one of God, i.e. an idea that purports to represent an object with infinite formal reality, i.e. an idea with infinite objective reality. So now he simply applies the principle that this idea must have been caused by something with at least as much formal reality as the idea has objective reality. But the idea has infinite objective reality. So it must have been caused by something with infinite formal reality. Therefore, a being with infinite formal reality must exist, in order to be doing this causing. But only God can have infinite formal reality. So God exists. It's not an argument that many people, even in Descartes' own time, found particularly convincing. But, for what it's worth, that is the argument.