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I read about the sorites paradox, especially "what is a heap?" and was a bit puzzled about the reasoning. Isn't it fairly straightforward to say, "fiftenn grains is not a heap" and "fifteen thousand grains is a heap" and then say, "even if we cannot give a single precise number where "not a heap" ends and "is a heap" begins, we can narrow down the range within which it occurs, right? In other words, a sort of "bounded fuzziness" applies, where we know for sure what is a heap and what is not a heap (the "bounded" part) while we cannot say exactly where the transition occurs (the "fuzziness" part). It also reminds me of Alexander the Great's solution to the Gordian Knot problem, in a way. People are getting confused because they are using the wrong tools, not because of the nature of the problem itself. the argument seems reminiscent of the supposed paradox about achilles and the tortoise, you can calculate the exact time at which Achilles catches and passes it.
Accepted:
February 2, 2012

Comments

Stephen Maitzen
February 2, 2012 (changed February 2, 2012) Permalink

The sorites paradox -- the paradox of the heap and similar paradoxes exploiting more important concepts than heap -- is a terrific topic. It's great to see people thinking about it.

You wrote, "we cannot say exactly where the transition occurs." Some philosophers would respond, "It can't occur exactly anywhere, because heap (or bald or tall or rich ...) isn't a concept that allows exact status-transitions. To say that there's an exact point of status-transition, even a point we can't know or say, is to misunderstand what vague concepts are."

Some philosophers would also object to your suggestion that the fuzziness can be "bounded," if by that you mean "sharply bounded." They'd say that any boundary around the fuzzy cases must itself be a fuzzy boundary: like the boundary between heap and non-heap, the boundary between definitely a heap and not definitely a heap isn't precise to within a single grain. (This phenomenon is usually called "higher-order vagueness.") In that case, the fuzziness that brought into doubt the existence of heaps also brings into doubt the existence of fuzzy boundaries themselves.

I don't think there's any way to cut the Gordian Knot here, if by that you mean finding a commonsense solution that cuts through the paradox. Why? Because the paradox itself results from commitments of common sense: (a) some number of grains is clearly too few to make a heap (maybe 15, as you say); (b) some number of grains is clearly enough to make a heap (maybe 15,000); and yet (c) one grain never makes the difference between any two different statuses (heap vs. non-heap, definitely a heap vs. not definitely a heap, etc.). Given commonsense logic, (a)-(c) can't all be true, but which one should we reject? Most philosophers who try to solve the paradox attack (c), but I certainly haven't seen a refutation of (c) that I'd call "commonsense."

I wish I knew the answer, or even knew of an answer that comes close to being satisfying. I sometimes worry that we human beings are smart enough to have discovered the sorites paradox but constitutionally too dumb to solve it. I'd love to be shown that my pessimism is unwarranted!

Recommended reading:
SEP, "Sorites Paradox"
SEP, "Vagueness"

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