Question I was combing through the recent questions and, although it has not yet been answered, noticed one about a person and his ex-philosophy-inclined-friend. This question in term led me to wonder about a more general question: the role of feelings in philosophy in general. Is philosophy just about reasoned argument, or would any credibility be given to a prominent philosopher who said something like: "I can't pinpoint what's wrong with this paper on the nature of friendship, but it just feels off to me". Or would a prominent philosopher not dare to say something like that? When a professional philosopher reads a paper, does s/he ever have an emotional response, is it suppressed, or, after years of training, does one learn simply to have no emotional response whatever. And, if there is one, does that in turn guide the thought process to any extent? At least as an impetus?

Accepted:
December 20, 2011

Comments

Emotion is very important in all human activities, philosophy included. Many arguments are fashioned as they are not in a disinterested desire to attain the truth but to get promoted, impress a potential partner, do down an enemy and so on. These might be regarded as cynical comments but then philosophers are usually human beings and they will then have human emotions.

One does sometimes just not like a theory and then we look for reasons of a logical kind to disprove it. It could be something about it that raises our suspicions, like someone we dislike propounding it, for example. One thing I have noted is that few philosophers like to admit they have changed their minds on an issue, we normally stick to our guns throughout our careers. After all, consistency is supposed to be a logical virtue.