Topics Philosophy

Question What place to science fiction and sci-fi-like thought experiments have in philosophy? Are they useful tools, or are they generally considered to be pointless speculation?

Accepted:
April 20, 2011

Comments

Thought experiments have a long and distinguished history both in philosophy and in other disciplines (Einstein, for example, used thought experiments in certain of his papers). Thought experiments have featured especially prominently in treatments of personal identity since John Locke's discussion of the topic in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published in the seventeenth-century, to more recent treatments of the topic by Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit. The question of the status and significance of such thought experiments has also received considerable discussion, reflecting the fact that the very nature of philosophy is itself a topic of philosophical interest. The philosopher Kathleen Wilkes has even written a book that attempts to treat personal identity without resorting to thought experiments of the sort found in many discussions of the topic, Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.

One worry about the appeal to thought experiments in discussions of personal identity--and more generally--is that they are 'intuition pumps'. If one thinks that intuitions are not necessarily good starting points for philosophical reflection, then one might worry that the science fiction scenarios that abound in the literature on personal identity--which include consideration of brain transplants and discussion of the significance for personal identity of human beings swapping memories, among other scenarios--do not reveal anything about the nature of personal identity, but only reflect what one might be inclined to say, now, about such amazing scenarios, which, since they are not real possibilities, are very difficult to assess and consequently may not reveal anything deep about personal identity at all. If, however, one thinks that intuitions are crucial starting points for philosophical reflection, then one might be more favorably inclined to such thought experiments, since consideration of them certainly does elicit intuitions that may not emerge when one considers 'ordinary' cases. (The philosopher Tamar Gendler has done considerable work on thought experiments: you might check out certain of her papers for detailed discussion of their nature and significance.)

The nature and significance of intuitions in philosophy has received some discussion in other entries on this site, and it is a topic of considerable interest among philosophers today, especially given recent interest in 'experimental philosophy' (or 'Xphi', as it is sometimes called). Xphi starts from surveys of intuitions about contested topics (such as free will, ethical judgments, etc.), and then sometimes seems to try to derive philosophical implications from the results of those surveys. But there remains considerable disagreement among philosophers as to what, exactly, the results of the Xphi surveys show, if anything. (For a wonderful introduction to Xphi, I highly recommend K. Anthony Appiah's book, Experiments in Ethics.)

The question of how significant intuitions are in philosophy goes very deep, to the nature of philosophy itself, and one's view on the importance of intuitions to philosophy may well have implications for what one takes the point of philosophy to be, and how philosophy is to be conducted. So what about the status of thought experiments? I myself am inclined to say that it depends on the thought experiment, and on what the response to the thought experiment is taken to reveal. I'm inclined, therefore, to resist pronouncing generally about thought experiments, and think that it is necessary to consider each thought experiment on a case-by-case basis, in order to determine how the thought experiment is supposed to work and what it is supposed to show, before deciding whether that particular thought experiment is indeed a useful tool for investigating the topic in question.

Question What place to science fiction and sci-fi-like thought experiments have in philosophy? Are they useful tools, or are they generally considered to be pointless speculation? Accepted:April 20, 2011

Question What place to science fiction and sci-fi-like thought experiments have in philosophy? Are they useful tools, or are they generally considered to be pointless speculation?

Accepted:
April 20, 2011