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Existence

Do categories exist? For instance: Animal. "Animal" is the name of a category, a set of things within certain parameters. Now, the animals themselves exist, but does "Animal" exist? After all, isn't "animal" just an name, an idea we have "created." That which composes a category exists, but does the category itself exist?
Accepted:
February 2, 2011

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Sean Greenberg
February 5, 2011 (changed February 5, 2011) Permalink

This is a version of the question of whether universals exist, about which there has been considerable philosophical discussion over the past 2500 years or so. Some philosophers--call them 'nominalists'--believe that the only things that exist are particulars: in the case of animals, then, only particular sloths, rabbits, dogs, etc. exist; some philosophers--call them 'realists'--believe that not only particulars, but kinds, or universals--in the case of animals, the kind 'sloth' or 'dog' or even 'animal' itself, distinct from particular instantiations of that kind--exist. (Some realists even believe that kinds or universals are the only real things, and that particulars aren't real, or at least not real in the same respect that universals are real.) It seems to me that where one stands with respect to the universalist/nominalist divide may in part reflect one's account of cognition, or how one comes to know things: if one believes that the senses are the only source of knowledge, then one may be inclined to think that only particulars exist, and that universals are abstractions formed on the basis of a consideration of particulars (such a position was taken by John Locke in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, where he said that kinds or sorts are "the workmanship of the understanding"); if, on the other hand, one thinks that in addition to the senses, human beings have the capacity to cognize the essences of things, then one will be inclined to think that universals exist. Further pressure towards one position or the other may come from whether one thinks that nature is, as it were, 'carved at the joints', or whether whatever carving is done is either done by human beings or happens over time, as, in the case of animals, in accordance with the dynamics of evolution. For one might think that if species--kinds or categories--themselves evolve or change, then they aren't real, because they are subject to change; alternatively, however, one might think that even though species may indeed change over time, there is more to a species than its particular members. So do categories or universals exist? I think one's answer to this question is shaped by the kinds of epistemological and metaphysical commitments that one is prepared to make, and what tradeoffs one is prepared to make if one does or doesn't make such commitments. To wit, if one doesn't believe that categories or universals exist, then one needs to give an account of how we come to use categorical or universal terms, and also to what those terms refer when one uses them; if one does believe that categories or universals exist, then, while one can easily explain the meaning and reference of categorical or universal terms, one will need to give an account of the nature of those universals, how we come to cognize them, how their existence is related to that of particulars. I think that there is much to be said on both sides: for what it's worth, I myself am not sure what I think--perhaps some other panelist has a firmer view on the matter.

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