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Logic

David Hume famously pointed out that there seems to be a logical gap that prevents us from concluding "ought" from "is". It seem to me that the truth of this general observation is still under discussion. Does deontic logic shine any light on this question, as one would expect it to, or does the problem morph into the question which form deontic logic should take?
Accepted:
January 26, 2011

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Richard Heck
February 13, 2011 (changed February 13, 2011) Permalink

The question whether "is" implies "ought", in the most obvious form, is just the question whether: p --> Op, where "Op" means: p ought to be the case. We can consider deontic logics with and without that axiom, if we wish, and I suppose we might learn something from deontic logic about its consequences. But the formal study of deontic logic itself isn't likely to tell us whether we should accept that axiom, any more than the formal study of modal logic will tell us what principles concerning metaphysical necessity we should accept.

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