Topics Philosophy

Question This might be a silly question, but can you argue against opinions? Someone once wrote to me "u can't argue with opinion". Is that true? I would think arguing against a person's opinion happens regularly-- philosophers certainly do it. And I thought that was the plain answer, but I thought about it more and well, question it. It is possible that this someone is already accepting the fact, or assuming that "opinion" is neither true nor false. For example, "It is my opinion that X is beauty, and Y is beauty for you," knowing that there is a difference of opinion, of which both can claim truth, you therefore can't argue with my opinion. This might be a case of relativism, "what's true for me, may not be true for you, etc". Anyways, I just want some clarity with the claim that "u can't argue with opinion."

Accepted:
January 26, 2011

Comments

The question isn't silly at all--I think it turns on two distinct senses of 'opinion'. In one sense, an opinion--like a belief--is a mental state, a fact about the person who holds it, that doesn't admit of justification, although one could of course explain why the person has come to hold the particular opinion, how they have come to be in that particular mental state; there is, however, another sense of 'opinion', according to which opinions, like beliefs, are held for reasons and therefore admit of justification. Insofar as one treats an opinion, or a belief, as a mere fact about a person, it doesn't admit of argument, anymore than the fact of someone's height admits of argument; insofar, however, as one treats an opinion, or a belief, as a claim held for reasons--instead of merely as a state of a person, or of a person's mind--then it does admit of argument. In the first sense of 'opinion', I think it's quite right that one can't argue with opinions; in the second sense, however, I think not only that opinions admit of, but actually invite, argument, because they invite requests for justification (in appropriate contexts, of course!). This distinction is related, I think, to the question of relativism: insofar as one treats opinions or beliefs as states of a person, facts about that person, they may be seen as fundamentally depending on the person in question, and her particular experiences, and hence this standpoint, I think, meshes nicely with relativism; insofar, however, as one treats opinions as admitting of justification, the conversation that relativism undercuts can get underway. (I should note, however, that I don't mean to imply that opinions or beliefs can't be both states of a person and admit of justification. Rather, I mean only to imply that one can't treat an opinion or a belief as both a fact and a claim that admits of justification at the same time and in the same respect.)

I agree with Sean's response, but I'd like to add a few, um, opinions of my own.

Some students believe that only "authorities" (e.g., teachers) know the "correct" answers to all questions. And they believe this until these students meet "authorities" who disagree. Such disagreements are not usually about mathematical or scientific questions (after all, everyone agrees that 2+2=4, and any math teacher who says otherwise is not really an authority on math). Rather, such disagreements are often about topics in the humanities, social studies, or philosophy ("Huckleberry Finn is the great American novel", says one; "No, it isn't", says another. "Mental states and processes are identical with brain states and processes"; "No, they're not". And so on.)

After encountering "authorities" who disagree, these students often decide that there are two kinds of questions: those about which "authorities" know the answers and those about which "authorities" don't know the answers yet (but the answers are knowable, and so the students' job is to learn how to find them).

But then these students begin to see that most questions are such that we don't know the answers to them. And, on these topics, they say, "everyone has a right to their own opinion". And such opinions cannot be argued with, for they are merely opinions.

With luck, such students then come to see that some opinions might be "better" than others: Perhaps one opinion makes more sense, or coheres better with other opinions, or makes better predictions, or can be inferred from other opinions with which one already agrees. Such opinions can be evaluated relative to a context of background opinions. And these opinions can be argued about (they might not make more sense, or might be inconsistent with other opinions, or might not make good predictions, or might not be inferrable, etc.).

This is a vast oversimplification of a theory of intellectual and ethical development due to the psychologist William Perry. But I think it helps clarify what some people mean when they say that "you can't argue against opinions"; such people are viewing intellectual discourse from what Perry called a "multiplistic" position: Let "multiple" opinions flourish; all are equally legitimate. It's a logically and chronologically later position than the "dualistic" position that says that only "authorities" have the answers, but it's an earlier position than "contextual relativism", which says that all "opinions" must be evaluated relative to their background context. Or, as I prefer to put it, all opinions should be considered to be conclusions of arguments, and those arguments can be evaluated for validity and soundness. The conclusion of a valid argument is only true relative to the truth of its premises.

(For more on Perry, link to my webpage "William Perry's Scheme of Intellectual and Ethical Development", which has links to the literature on the subject.)