The AskPhilosophers logo.

Ethics

Utilitarianism takes the "good" to be that which provides pleasure, or benefit, or reduces suffering. But how does the utilitarian decide that pleasure, benefit or lack of suffering are the yardsticks for ethics? It could be coherent that there are pleasurable things (that don't simultaneously cause suffering) which are unethical, or that there are ethically necessary actions which don't provide any pleasure for anybody, and even increase suffering. I am thinking of ethical, moral or religious systems that, for example, harshly restrict sexuality, the consumption of foods, certain forms of art, etc. So how does the utilitarian view argue that pleasure and pain are indeed, indisputably (from its own point of view, anyway), the foundations of ethics? Is this just common sense, or is there something more?
Accepted:
January 4, 2011

Comments

Thomas Pogge
January 11, 2011 (changed January 11, 2011) Permalink

Yes, the options you outline are coherent, and it's therefore not a necessary truth that the good coincides with pleasure and the avoidance of pain. This is essentially G. E. Moore's "further question" argument presented in his Principia Ethica: "whatever definition [of "good"] be offered, it may always, with significance, of the complex so defined, be asked whether it is itself good."

Much of what utilitarians say in support of their view is indeed commonsensical: when we look for the good for human beings, we should look for what they naturally strive to attain and strive to avoid. Most people do strive for pleasure or at least are glad when it comes their way; and most people strive to avert pain. In the famous (but flawed and clumsy) statement of John Stuart Mill: "thesole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is thatpeople do actually desire it. ... No reason can be given why the generalhappiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to beattainable, desires his own happiness. This however being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the caseadmits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good:that each person’s happiness is a good to that person, and the generalhappiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. ... We have now, then, an answer to thequestion, of what proof the principle of utility is susceptible. If the opinion which I have now stated ispsychologically true — if human nature is so constituted as to desire nothingwhich is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness, we can have noother proof, and we require no other, that ... happiness is the sole end ofhuman action, and the promotion of it the test by which to judge ofall human conduct.”

To be sure, some people strive for things other than pleasure, for instance for an understanding of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, and some people even strive for pain, perhaps by walking barefoot on smoldering coals. Utilitarians might discount such people as outliers. Or they can argue that the fact that someone persists in behaving in this way shows that this behavior pleases her.

Another way to reach the utilitarian conclusion is to start from the thought that moral instructions, which may demand that one act differently from how one is otherwise inclined to act, must have a point or a rationale. It's a perfectly plausible rationale for a restriction that, by violating it, one would be hurting others. And similarly, it's a perfectly plausible rationale for an injunction that, by following it, one would be making others happy. But what would be the point of a restriction on eating cabbage, say, or of an injunction to dress in yellow on Thursdays?

Perhaps the most telling objection to the utilitarian account of the good concerns its implications for what sort of beings we should strive to be (and strive to mould our children to be). Should we really aim for a transformation of humanity into simple superficial beings, immune to love sickness and Weltschmerz and taking delight in cheaply mass-producible entertainments that are today the staple of daytime television and video arcades? Is a world of happy morons really what we should strive to realize if we can?

  • Log in to post comments
Source URL: https://askphilosophers.org/question/3773?page=0
© 2005-2025 AskPhilosophers.org