Topics Philosophy

Question It seems that the psychological and emotional difficulties experienced in life by individuals such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Artur Schopenhauer and Max Weber lead many people to be more skeptical of the theories and works of these individuals than they otherwise would, regardless of the content of these works and theories. What is the meaning relationship between a philosopher's work and his psychological issues? Surely all philosophers are influenced in their thought by the things that have happened to them in their lives, so why should some have their work dismissed or explained away, in part, via their personal issues, while others don't? Where is the line?

Accepted:
November 24, 2010

Comments

It is certainly true that all philosophers are influenced by the place and time in which they live, by their personalities, and by the interests they have as individuals. Philosophers are human beings, after all!

But what happens as a result of this ‘influence’? Does it mean the adoption of certain styles of writing, the use of particular forms of argumentation, tendency to use this type of example rather than that, more or less frequent reference to certain other philosophers or traditions, choice of topic (since some topics will appear more urgent to me than to others by virtue of who I am and where and when I live), even choice of methods (I may have a predisposition to skepticism, empiricism, idealism, etc.)? All of these effects, however, do not have any necessary (or even likely) effect upon the value of the philosophical work, either to contemporary philosophy or to a previous era, provided they remain either at the level of ornamentation, or are employed undogmatically.

The assumption behind the above is that proper philosophy is at least ideally separable from the person that ‘does’ it. A is a philosopher only if A’s work appears valuable even to those others who do not already agree with A, and who are quite unlike A. B is not a philosopher if one has to be very much like B and in agreement with B’s various idiosyncrasies, in order to find B’s work of value. In other words, if B’s work is in some essential way inseparable from who B is.

Generally, we also assume that this separation of A’s life and A’s philosophy happens already in A. That is, however eccentric or downright dysfunctional A may be (and we all know how many of those there have been!), A holds his philosophical work ‘above’ this, and speaks universally, though in a highly individual voice.

This is the problem with the philosophers that you mention. Many simply cannot see Nietzsche as able to do this; his philosophical writings are never more than autobiography, it is said. Even many who do take Nietzsche seriously as a philosopher tend to focus on those of his works that are more conventionally philosophical (Such as the Genealogy of Morals) rather than those that those written in a more thoroughly, inseparably, individual manner (such as Thus Spoke Zarathustra).

However, the assumption -- of an ideal separation between the life of the philosopher and the philosopher he or she produces -- can be challenged. And, indeed, Nietzsche is one who does so. ‘It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy hitherto has been: a confession on the part of its author and a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir’ (Beyond Good and Evil, sec. 6). Now we could read this (and some do) as Nietzsche claiming that the problem has been insufficient impersonality, philosophy has remained locked within its various individual, historically contingent ‘prejudices’. I argue that this is a mistake: when Nietzsche says ‘great’ here, he means it. Nietzsche’s point is that philosophy only has value to the extent that it cannot be ideally separated from its author.