Topics Ethics

Question Do (or should) public figures--professional athletes, politicians, film stars--have a moral obligation to serve as role models for society? Another way to ask this: do public figures have a moral obligation above and beyond that of a non-public figure to act in a morally permissible or morally good way? Take, for instance, the professional athlete who abuses his child or the politician who cheats on his or her spouse. Assuming that such actions are prima facie wrong (leaving aside scenarios in which, say, utilitarianism would morally allow or demand such actions), are there any extra moral obligations that a public figure has--or is there any extra moral weight to their actions--just in virtue of being a public figure?

Accepted:
June 30, 2010

Comments

I think the answer is yes, many public figures have some moral obligations beyond those of non-public figures, at least if we make a few assumptions:

1. People want and need role models, especially children.

2. The actions of the people we take to be role models influences us, at a minimum by making us happier when they do impressive things (e.g., athletic performances, wonderful art, inspiring political decisions) and by making us sadder when they do despicable things (e.g., betraying their family, embezzling, acting hypocritically, etc.), and possibly more so to the extent that they make it more likely that people emulate their immoral behavior.

3. The public figures know that 1 and 2 are true--that is, they know their behavior is public and that it may influence people's attitudes and behaviors.

4. As you say, there are some facts about what is moral and immoral.

Having said this, two caveats:

1. The assumptions above apply wherever people have role models, so to the extent a parent, an uncle, a teacher, a professor, a coach, a priest, a mentor, etc. is a role model, they thereby take on that extra moral obligation to avoid the negative influences that would be a side-effect of their immoral behavior. The public figures simply have the potential to influence a lot more people.

2. There may also be a reason that the public should not expect certain public figures to be role models. We probably should not expect some famous people, like many professional athletes and entertainers, to be particularly good role models, though many are. Their particular skills seem unrelated to being a moral paragon, and some aspects of the lifestyle that attends their fame and fortune may increase the temptations to act immorally. On the other hand, I think we have every reason to expect our politicians, religious leaders, etc. to exemplify the moral virtues that they preach.

I am inclined to think that public figures typically do have obligations to the public that go beyond the obligations of non-public figures. Often, there are forward-looking consequential reasons for this additional responsibility. As public figures, their behavior is likely to be more influential, and so the obligation we all have to exercise our influence responsibly requires more of them. Also, there are often backward-looking reasons for this additional responsibility. Of course, in the case of some public officials, they have campaigned for positions of public trust and have taken oaths to serve their constituents and/or the common good. But many other public figures, who have not run for public office and taken oaths of responsibility, have nonetheless knowingly pursued public exposure and benefited financially (and otherwise) from their roles in the public eye. Fairness arguably generates duties toward other participants in a practice one has benefited from.

These forward-looking and backward-looking reasons for special responsibility concern the ground of the duty to others but not its content. So they don't settle what exactly public figures owe the public. Do their special responsibilities require them to be role models? That's a hard question. In the case of the backward-looking reasons, it really depends on the reasons in question. In the quasi-contractual case of public officials, it would seem to depend in part upon what their oath specified. If they promised good private and public behavior, then they owe both. But if all they promised is honest and responsible government, not squeaky-clean personal lives, then they may have no backward-looking duty to be role models. If so, they may have prudential reasons for good behavior, but not a special moral obligation. So too with fairness to give back to other participants in a beneficial practice. There may be many ways to give back, not involving a spotless private life. I suppose that it is the forward-looking or consequentialist considerations that speak most directly to the role model duty. If we all have a duty to exercise our influence over others responsibly, and it's just that public figures exert more influence, then it seems they would have special duties to be good role models.