Topics Ethics

Question Why do philosophers seem to object to anthropomorphic moral and value claims? In other words, what's wrong embracing our parochial human interests completely? Say for instance a rare slug which we know conclusively to have no non-aesthetic value occupies space that prevents the construction of a hydroelectric dam. Why should we not say, "Screw the slug, humanity is more important" and proceed accordingly? More abstractly, why has morality (excepting maybe Nietzsche) not attempted to reconcile humanity's obvious selfishness, bias, violence and greed with what we might call "pure" ethics. Moreover, what's to stop us from simply re-defining our philosophical terms in order to make this more palatable, e.g. by defining "free will" as "whatever it is that humans do/experience" as an easy out from some sticker philosophical dilemmas? Thanks in advance for any responses.

Accepted:
June 29, 2010

Comments

I agree that there is ample evidence of obvious human bias, greed, violence, selfishness, but I suggest that there is also ample evidence of human impartiality, benevolence, love of others, unselfish compassion. Though I am not a neo-Darwinian or a great fan of Darwin's ethics (especially his views on human races in On the Descent of Man), Darwin does make a good case that human violence, selfishness and so on cannot (if there is to be evolution) be unbridled. Given more time, I would like to develop an argument for you that in fact some form on non-violent goodness is an essential precondition for any human life, but I will cut to the chase. I suggest that one of the reasons why many of today are reluctant to simply say (to use your vivid language!): "Screw the slug, humanity is more important" is because we have seen some rather ugly results from (more or less) adopting the view that it is permissible for us (again, using one of your terms) "Screw the other species and the natural world itself, humanity is more important." Some of us do think nonhuman species and perhaps even whole ecosytems have values quite independent of human use (either direct or indirect) and try to challenge some human development in light of those nonhuman goods, but I must concede that those of us in this camp (and I am one of them) do not have a rigorous methodology of when (for example) to block a hydroelectric dam and when not to. Your case of the dam versus the slug makes it hard to root for the slug, but if the dam was not itself essential and there are alternative forms of energy that would do comparatively less damage to fish / wildlife, don't you think we should give weight to the alternative energy? Even if you only go with humanist (or what you refer to as anthropomorphic values) we might want to go with the alternative because of the use of such life for future generations.

As for free will: good suggestion! Some philosophers do seem to take a position similar to the one you describe. They assume (or claim to have good grounds for holding) that we do in fact have free will and then claim that this is not or would not be undermined if determinism turns out to be both true and compelling. I take a minority position on such matters and suggest that if determinism is true, we are not morally accountable for our action (and characters) and that if we had compelling reasons to think it true we could not consistently engage in many practices of praising and blaming that we do now. So, I suggest the stakes are quite high and there is no "easy out." But your proposal is an important one, and one that probably some of my colleagues on this panel adopt.