Question Does worthwhile Philosophy start with good questions or can it start with the proper mood? I am an International Relations major and have decided on writing my honors thesis on a question of political philosophy, not because I have a burning question, but rather because it was the subject I enjoyed the most and because I want to understand whether or not it is something I'd like pursuing in the future in the form of a postgraduate degree. I often find myself in what I - and some friends- call a "Philosophical mood" -though the friends are not without irony when the employ the term- i.e. in the mood for thinking and discussing dispassionately about what I am passionate about. I think Heidegger privileged moods as a way to knowing. I've decided researching the nature of power and the use of this concept in twentieth-Century political thought because I want to satisfy my mood, not because it seems like a burning question. Can real philosophy come from this? Is it (I know it is unscientific) silly to pursue moods and not questions? Does philosophy start with good questions or the proper mood?

Accepted:
August 2, 2010

Comments

Great questions! In a way, it is difficult to begin philosophy without there being some kind of mood --whether this be openness or inquisitiveness. It has been said that philosophy begins in wonder, and I suppose one may think of wonder as a mood. Some philosophers have interpreted this as philosophy beginning with puzzlement and understood the goal of philosophy to be the dispelling of puzzlement. But I suggest "wonder" might also be fascination or awe or even reverence. I suspect that when you get in a "philosophical mood" you probably are prepared to set aside distractions and work from a whole host of what might be called moods: fascination, awe, reverence, inquisitiveness.... but also possibly anger, love or hate and more. If we follow Socrates and the Platonic tradition generally, there are certain moods or emotions that can aid or that can hinder philosophical reflection. Those impairing philosophical inquiry include jealousy, envy, impatience and vanity. I believe the majority in the Platonic tradition would also include rage as a mood or emotion that inhibits reflection. Some great philosophical works have been written in rage --Burke on the French revolution and on the nature of political order, for example. But while the rage fueled some extraordinary English prose, and Burke's work has been influential in the 20th century (Michael Oakshot) the rage also drove him to present some stories as fact when there was no historical basis for doing so. Positive moods or emotions are (again, in the Platonic tradition) those that tend to put the ego to one side "and follow the argument wherever it leads."

Philosophers in the so-called Continental tradition such as Heidegger and Sartre spent more time reflecting on moods than their Anglo-Saxon analytic counterparts, but you can find some fascinating reflections on philosohical methodology and a person's personality in the work of William James.

Isn't that simply a false dichotomy? You need the good questions and the right spirit of enquiry. If you've no clear, well-formulated, questions then you'll just produce an ill-directed ramble. If you aren't driven by curiosity actually to explore the good questions, if you lack the desire to follow the argument wherever it leads, then nothing will come of having raised the questions!

But I'd just add that there is nothing at all special about philosophy here. It's the same whether cosmology or molecular biology, history or the study of ancient Athens are your thing. Enquiry needs to be guided by good questions and driven on by the right spirit of 'wonder'.

Or at least that's the ideal! Of course, there's lots of routine hack work in science and history, mechanically grinding away in a low grade way. And equally --- though don't spread the word too enthusiastically! -- there's lots of routine hack work in philosophy (regrettable, maybe, but people do need publications for tenure, and have to satisfy "research assessment exercises" and the like).