Topics Philosophers

Question I was trying to explain Wittgenstein to a friend using the "if a tree falls in the woods..." question. I suggested that it depends entirely on what you refer to as "sound": vibration or sensation. The person I was talking with insisted that no, only a narcissist would assume it wouldn't make a sound just because there is nobody there to hear it. What about the birds, he asked. First of all, is my use of the tree falling conundrum an appropriate way to introduce someone to Wittgenstein? Was I perverting Philosophical Investigations? What would have been a better way to get across the importance of Wittgenstein in this case?

Accepted:
May 13, 2010

Comments

I can't answer wrt Wittgenstein in this case -- I don't know his specific views here -- but the general question IS an old one, and received some very provocative treatements in the early modern period (esp 17th-18th century, esp. in the work of the Idealist George Berkeley) -- I'll merely answer the point as your friend made it -- namely, anyone who argues that such a tree does NOT make a 'sound' is (a) definitely referring to sensation, not vibration as you put it, and (b) tends to allow that any "mind" or "any" perceiver would be sufficient for the "sound" to exist in addition to the vibration -- so the presence of a bird would suffice! I don't know of any philosopher who would hold that ONLY human perceivers work here ...

However: the latter does raise the discussion to the next level: does a given vibration 'sound' the same to us and to the bird? does it sound the same even to different human perceivers? if not, what does that show? (maybe that sound IS subjective, exists only in the mind of perceivers, thus cannot be identified with vibrations?)

best,