Question I was wondering why philosophers, as far as I know, insist that one must be consistent in one's ethical behavior and philosophy. Why would it be bad if I do X one day and don't do X the next day? I change from day to day, the world around me changes, and no two situations are ever exactly identical.

Accepted:
March 19, 2010

Comments

I'm reminded of a famous remark from the economist, John Maynard Keynes. On once being accused of inconsistency -- what I believe the Americans like to call 'flip-flopping' -- he replied: "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?" I don't think any philosophers would wish to insist that one's ethical behaviour and philosophy must always remain consistent over time. In terms of individual actions, when the situations are not identical, it might well be absolutely appropriate to behave in different ways. And even in terms of more general ethical principles, it's entirely right and proper for us to reassess and potentially revise these in response to changes in the world or even just changes in ourselves.

The kind of consistency that I think philosophers would, however, wish to insist upon is consistency at a particular time, or within a particular situation. If one maintains as a general rule that nobody, oneself included, ought to do X, and yet still goes ahead and does X anyway, then something has gone wrong. One is not being true to one's own avowed principles, if one affirms them and yet violates them at the very same time. Either (i) one doesn't really believe the general rule to which one is paying lip-service: but then one is being insincere, and insincerity is not a good thing. Or (ii) one is doing something that one does genuinely believe to be wrong: and that suggests moral depravity, or at least weakness of will. Or (iii) perhaps one has failed to recognise the logical implications of the rule that one is affirming, and simply doesn't realise that this particular action falls within the class of actions that it forbids. And this can occur quite easily. When one embraces moral precepts at a very general and abstract level, it can actually become extremely hard to unpick what they do in fact imply for specific concrete situations. Many thousands, maybe even millions of pages have been written by moral philosophers on precisely this problem. (One might, for instance, believe in a universal and inalienable right to life. But does this general principle encompass cases of warfare, or capital punishment, or self-defence, or abortion, or euthanasia, or meat-eating? It is far from clear). And, when someone is guilty only of failing to spot logical connections of this kind, I suppose this is not exactly a moral failing, but merely an intellectual one. If even the moral philosophers themselves find it tricky, then the rest of us can't very well be blamed for failing to see every last consequence of the principles we endorse. But, when we do recognise such inconsistency in ourselves, between our behaviour and our own avowed principles, this realisation should prompt us to reassess things, and either change our behaviour or revise our more general ethical beliefs. And equally, when we identify it in someone else, although perhaps we shouldn't condemn them on that basis alone, what we should do is challenge them. We should attempt to help them to recognise their own inconsistency, in hopes that, having first seen it, they too might then take steps to correct it.