Topics Rationality

Question Suppose an angel visits me tonight and tells me that when I reach the age of 60, I will suddenly find great enjoyment in the music of Kenny G. The angel also tells me that by the time I am 60, Kenny G records will be in short supply, so it might be prudent to stock up on them now. As of now, I hate Kenny G music. The thought of my future self listening to Kenny G in the future disgusts me. Would it be rational for me to avoid buying Kenny G records today, in order to sabatoge my future self's attempts to listen to Kenny G? Or would it be rational to stock up on them now, which would further the goals of my future self while undermining the goals of my current self?

Accepted:
October 8, 2009

Comments

Your question concerns the nature of our rights and obligations with respect to our future selves. My answer shall simply assume, as I think you do, that the angel's prediction is utterly reliable, that there won't be other ways to access Kenny G music in the future, that the pleasure of my future self is not immoral, and that stocking up on Kenny G records is not a huge inconvenience to your present self.

The rationality of your decision then depends on two things: (1) how much you care about your future self, and (2) how much you care that your future self be like your present self.

(1) Some people care a lot about their future selves and try to plan accordingly -- making sacrifices in the present in order to secure the happiness of future selves, and taking pleasure in the mere contemplation of a future self's happiness. Others care much less -- investing little in the happiness of future selves, and finding little pleasure in the contemplation of a future self's happiness. This contrast is exactly like the contrast between people who care a lot about their children and people who care less about their children. Not to care at all would be immoral insofar as we ought to care about all other selves to some degree, and insofar as we have special obligations to those who we have helped to create and those who are most dependent on us (something that is at least as true of our future selves as of our children). But rationality can't tell us just how much we ought to care about our future selves any more than it can tell us just how much we ought to care about our children; it can only help tell us what actions are appropriate if we care a lot, and what actions are appropriate if we care very little.

(2) Some people want their future selves to be continuations of their present selves, while other people welcome change. I might care a lot (now) about having a future self that is a lot like my present self -- worrying, therefore, about the possibility of losing my memories, my intellect, and my friends; or I might not care much (now) about what sort of old person I become -- realizing that there are many different ways for older people to be happy, and not particularly caring which way works out for me. This contrast, too, has a counterpart with respect to how we care about our children: some parents are very concerned that their children share their own values and pursuits, others are happy as long as their children are happy. Some stability is needed in order to make any significant plans or promises, and thus to have a self at all. But, again, rationality can't tell us just how much stability is desirable; there is nothing that says that choosing a stable future is inherentlymore rational than choosing a changing future (or vice versa).

The rational thing for you to do, then, after hearing from the angel about the desires of your 60 year old self, will depend both on how much you care about your future self and how much you care that your future self be like your present self. If care a lot about your future self, but don't care whether it is much like your present self, then you should indeed buy the Kenny G records. If you don't care a lot about your future self, or only care insofar as it is like your present self, then you should not buy the Kenny G records now.