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Is hypocrisy morally wrong? Suppose you publicly advocate some good principle X, but privately violate X. Violating X is wrong, but surely it's still right to advocate X in public. You shouldn't encourage others to violate X like you do!
Accepted:
October 3, 2009

Comments

Richard Heck
October 6, 2009 (changed October 6, 2009) Permalink

That all seems right, to be sure. But I'm not sure we're thinking about the question whether hypocrisy is wrong in quite the right way. For note, first of all, that, even if hypocrisy is wrong, that does not mean that the solution should be to cease advocating what is right. It might, rather, be to stop doing what is wrong.

But there are other options you might consider. The case you suggest has it that what is being advocated is good, but is privately violated. There seem to me to be other cases, however; and even this case has different versions. Here are some cases:

  1. Fred might vociferously advocate that one ought to do X, when, indeed, one ought, but not himself do X.
  2. Fred might wholeheartedly insist that one ought to do X, when it is morally permissible but not obligatory to do X, and himself not do X.
  3. Fred might repeatedly claim that one ought to do X, when it is morally impermissible to do X, but himself refrain from X-ing.
  4. Fred might strenuously argue that one must not do X, when, indeed, one ought not, but himself do X.
  5. Fred might publicly urge that it is morally permissible to do X, but privately regard X-ers as morally subpar and criticize them to his friends.

Whether (4) really gives us anything different from (1) isn't clear. But (1)-(3) all seem quite different, and (5) is different still, and there are other cases that differ from (5) the way (2) and (3) differ from (1). Let's just talk, then, about (2).

In (2), Fred's not doing X is morally permissible, so unobjectionable, in a sense. But, of course, one might critcize Fred for endorsing principles he ought not to endorse. And, more interestingly. one might find Fred at fault for doing X, since he acts contrary to a principle he himself endorses, even though it is one he ought not to endorse. He is acting in ways for which he is apparently criticizing others and, one might suppose, for which he would publicly suggest they ought somehow to be held to account. So he is acting in ways to which he is committed to regarding himself as subject to the same sort of criticism. And yet, presumably, he is unwilling to censure himself in the ways for which he would be happy to censure others. That, it seems to me, is what is fundamentally objectionable about hypocrisy.

And then there is yet a different case. Perhaps Fred is willing to censure himself for his private behavior. If so, then what we have is not hypocrisy, as I'd understand it. Rather, in one form—this is roughly the case of President Obama sneaking a cigarette—it would be what philosophers call "weakness of the will". More extreme cases—such as the conservative politician who's having homosexual encounters in bathrooms—are just pathological.

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