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Value

Many ideas on the 'meaning of life' (assuming death is an ultimate fate of non-existence) presuppose that meaning may still be derived in this world through the actions we make and the impact we leave, our 'legacies.' However, it is perfectly rational and scientifically plausible that not only will we die, but our entire race, world, and indeed the universe itself (at least this incarnation of it, assuming there ARE multiple incarnations) must some day end. Assuming this is in fact true, doesn't the argument that the meaning of life can be derived from our impact on the world seem, if not wholly incorrect, than at least rendered moot by the rather over bearing reality that whatever impact we have is not merely fleeting but permanently erased?
Accepted:
September 28, 2009

Comments

Eddy Nahmias
October 1, 2009 (changed October 1, 2009) Permalink

I would suggest reading a wonderful essay by Thomas Nagel titled "The Absurd" (try here). One point it makes is that if our lives would be absurd or meaningless if they are fleeting (or if human existence is fleeting and small), then they would just be more absurd if they were longer (e.g., eternal) or had a larger place in the universe. In this case, says Nagel, size doesn't matter.

Rather, what matters is whether our lives have meaning from within (e.g., from within our human cultures and relationships) rather than from some external (impossible?) point of view. And there looks to be every reason to think that our lives do have meaning from within--that the projects we engage in and the love we give and receive and the experiences we have, at least if they are good, are important, significant, meaningful, far from absurd. (Oh, and what makes them count as good is also determined, I think, from within our system of social and personal relationships, which makes morality and meaning relative to our systems, but this does not mean that they are entirely subjective or ungrounded).

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