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Many animal rights ideologies deny the existence of human exceptionalism. Some going so far as to call the idea, "Speciesism." But, if we drop this idea of human exceptionism for some utilitarian style of ethics, wouldn't the whole idea, as currently understood of human rights, fall with it? The UN charter itself states: "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person..." but if we disregard this inherent "dignity and worth" of the human person, what becomes of human rights? If we take a view that a eating a retarded human is no different than eating a retarded pig (an opinion I read in one of the responses here), then what becomes of human rights, and our inherent "dignity and worth"? And aside from the utilitarian implications of human exceptionalism (inherent human rights) don't you think that humans do inhabit a special place in the world? Are we not, something more than mere animals? Basically does the human soul exist?
Accepted:
September 6, 2009

Comments

Sally Haslanger
September 12, 2009 (changed September 12, 2009) Permalink

There's a lot that has been and can be said about this issue, but maybe I can suggest one helpful thought.

There are really two different questions implicit in your question. One is whether anyone or anything has rights, thinking of rights as bringing with them strict obligations that cannot be overridden by such considerations as the greater happiness of others. A different question is whether there are specifically human rights.

One might reject utilitarianism and hold that some beings have rights that it would be wrong to violate for the sake of maximizing utility, but still reject the idea that there are special human rights, i.e., rights that we have simply by virtue of being human. For example, perhaps things that have certain mental capacities -- possibly capacities to form their own conception of the good -- have a right not to be sacrificed for greater average (or aggregate) happiness. This need not be construed as a human right, for it isn't a right we have by virtue of being human, and beings other than humans can have this right, if they have the requisite capacities. I think it is quite plausible that humans have rights, but quite implausible that there are human rights, if we understand that as rights we get by virtue of our species membership. However, the term 'human right' is sometimes just used to mean something like a fundamental or very important right for humans, which is compatible with the idea that we have rights, but there are no rights we have by virtue of being human.

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