Question I am perplexed by Alexander George's recent posting (http://www.askphilosophers.org/question/2854). He says "Your observation that we sometimes take pleasure in beliefs even if they have been irrationally arrived at seems correct but beside the point: it speaks neither to the truth of (1) nor to that of (2)." (2), in this case, is "(2) that actions guided by false beliefs are not likely to get us what we want. " I believe the science of psychology has shown us that we form many beliefs entirely irrationally. The mechanism for their formation is often a defense mechanism. The purpose of their formation is often to hide some truth about ourselves from ourselves - to hide some unpleasant information that we would have gleaned had we formed our belief rationally. I just can't see how the above information is "beside the point". The point is: 1) I want to be happy. 2) My beliefs are formed irrationally in order to reach that desired end. Perhaps what is beside the point is that the belief-forming mechanism is unconscious or subconscious rather than deliberate. Professor George also seems to take offense at the questioner's tone. Perhaps this is why he ignores the questioner's question: has the site lost some of its rigor since the days of 8 responses when the panelists routinely qualified each other's positions and called each other out when answers were not sufficiently rigorous? Regarding this offense at the questioner's tone: wasn't Socrates put to death because people were offended by his questions? It seems anathema to philosophy to take offense at questions. That the questioner did not display enough rigor in saying that a panelist's position "seems utterly preposterous" is to be expected - after all, the questioner is not a trained philosopher! As a frequent visitor to this site for many years I can say that, to me, it resembles Democracy: a place that should welcome critics as patriots.

Accepted:
September 3, 2009

Comments

This discussion has (so far) generated more heat than light. Let us all remember a crucial maxim: attack the argument, not the person. (Rationale: the latter is an ad hominem fallacy).

Now about the philosophical issue. Perhaps I can first try to clarify what has been said so far (as far as I can tell). The original post argued that philosophers are in an awkward position, since they rely upon their reason, even though human beings are driven by an irrational fear of death. Professor Smith responded by clarifying (a point muddled in the original post) that beliefs are rational or irrational, rather than facts. He also ended his post by noting that we should not rely upon irrational beliefs, because they cannot get us what we really want. Then there was a reply which maintained that irrationally formed beliefs can sometimes get us what we want, provided that we want to be happy, etc. Then there was a back and forth about who is missing the point.

In all of this, an interesting question got lost: Suppose it is the case that we come to believe, presumably through some kind of irrational process - such as Freud's pleasure principle or what cognitive psychologists call "motivated irrationality" - a false proposition which flies in the face of our available evidence. This is what philosophers normally describe as "self-deception". A standard case involves a wife who continues to believe that her husband is faithful, even though he repeatedly comes home late at night, smelling of perfume, etc. Now the question on the table is this: What if she is happier with this false belief? The wife does not want to believe that her husband is unfaithful. And self-deception gives her what she want. (I believe that there was recently a paper published about this question: Kirsch, J., 2005, “What's So Great about Reality?”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35/3: 407-428).

This is a huge topic that deserves all of our attention. It raises an interesting question: Is it really the case that the wife wants to believe that her husband is faithful? One might say that what she really wants is that her husband actually is faithful. Moreover: it would seem that the false belief that he is faithful will do nothing to help bring it about that he really is. There is a lot more, obviously, to say about this topic. But we won't get anywhere unless we agree to respect each other more.

Just a footnote to Mark Collier's helpful post. I actually said that irrationally formed beliefs are not likely to lead to actions which get us what we want (rather than cannot get us what we want). And that claim is enough to explain why we should in general care a lot about forming our beliefs in a rational way . Which in turn is enough to counter the original questioner's worry that philosophy "uses as its main tool a mechanism [rational thought] that is the opposite of what is most important to us": in general, rational belief-formation matters for getting whatever is important to us. Even if pockets of irrationality, episodes of self-deception, etc. can -- by good fortune -- happen to promote our welfare.