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Justice
Religion

Many people believe that it is inappropriate to impose one's religious beliefs on others. A principal reason for this belief is simply the observation that not everyone shares the same religion (and many are not religious at all). But mightn't a zealot simply say that, while he recognizes that many people disagree with him, he happens to be extremely confident that they are wrong? So I guess my question is this: In the endorsement of religious toleration, the separation of church and state, etc. is it implicit that religious people don't hold their religious beliefs very strongly?
Accepted:
June 22, 2009

Comments

Peter S. Fosl
June 26, 2009 (changed June 26, 2009) Permalink

No and yes. Historically, the idea of toleration developed along side streams of philosophical scrutiny of religious belief that suggested, rightly I think, that there's just not very good reason for zealous commitment to religious beliefs. So, while a zealot may, as you describe it, be exceedingly confident or dogmatic in his or her belief, there's no sound justification for doing so. In this sense, strains of modern skepticism have tempered religious belief in the form of what early modern thinkers called "enthusiasm." But, on the other hand, there are many ways of holding a belief "strongly." There are, one might say, ways of holding religious beliefs strongly that are consistent with tolerance and ways of holding beliefs strongly that are inconsistent. Tolerance itself commonly suggests that contrary views are considered wrong and even, perhaps, obnoxious. So, analogously, we speak of a body's capacity to tolerate a toxin or to tolerate the cold, etc. So, just as we might speak of a person who is able to tolerate extremely cold temperatures, we might meaningfully speak of someone with the capacity to tolerate views with which he or she is in profound disagreement. Furthermore, tolerance is ultimately about conduct. One might believe very strongly that atheists are going to be damned but still not think that the state or anyone else ought to coerce them to become religious believers. I think this has also been one of the inheritances of early modernity. Early modern religious conflict became so unpleasant to people that simply as a practical matter they agreed that society is better off tolerating religious difference than trying to enforce uniformity. Part of that agreement was that while believers in a given dogma would not attempt to enforce their beliefs upon others, others would not enforce contrary beliefs upon them. So, for many the network of thinking surrounding the cultivation of tolerance did temper religious belief; and for others it created a space where it remained possible to hold strong religious beliefs but not enforce those beliefs where others are concerned.

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