Topics Ethics

Question Richard Holloway, in 'Godless Morality', argues that "ritual practice" is not the same as "ethical principle." As an example, he argues that the practice of refraining from eating pork in Muslim and Jewish religious cultures is not per se an ethical action, merely the instantiation of an ethical principle which is keeping a promise to one's god. Thus, to eat pork, the ethical principle broken would be that of breaking a promise; the eating of pork itself would not be unethical, as the proscription of pork was merely a historical/sociological/anthropological/geographical accidentality. Clearly there are many ways to break a promise, but only one ethical principle for each 'set' of manifestations of it (following Holloway's theory). The above is, at any rate, the way I have tried to explain it to my grade 12 (last year of high school) Philosophy students. Does this explanation hold, and what are the problems with it? (I am presuming it is problematic because, although it appears convincing, I am still troubled by it...but I can't articulate why!). Many thanks.

Accepted:
April 28, 2009

Comments

One distinction at work here is that between (as I would say) duties and obligations. We are subject to certain (general) duties regardless of circumstances, and we acquire (specific) obligations pursuant to such a duty in the presence of certain triggering conditions contained in this duty. To use the example you give: we have a duty to (try hard to) fulfill our promises, and therefore an obligation to (try hard to) abstain from pork if this is what we've promised. Or another example: I have a duty to rescue people from a serious emergency if I can do so safely, and therefore an obligation to save this child in danger of drowning in a shallow pond nearby.

Now using this distinction, one may argue with Holloway that there is no duty to abstain from pork, only an obligation on the part of those who have made a promise to do so. But is this the correct reconstruction of what Muslims and Jews believe? If this were the correct reconstruction, then Muslims and Jews would have to believe either that it is perfectly fine for their children to eat pork so long as these children have not made a promise to God, or that a promise made centuries ago can bind (trigger obligations for) the progeny of the promisor(s).

Given this dilemma, we should look for alternatives to Holloway's reconstruction. I can see three. The first is structurally similar: we have a duty to obey God's commands and (since He has so commanded) an obligation to abstain from pork.

The other two alternatives present abstention from pork as a duty and hence as independent of any triggering circumstances. Such a duty can be related to theistic religion in two ways, nicely distinguished in Plato's dialogue Euthyphro. God might be the best source of knowledge about morality (which exists independently of Him), informing us that we have -- among other duties -- a duty to abstain from pork. Or God might be the source of morality itself, creating any duties we have, including a duty to abstain from pork as well as a duty to fulfill our promises.