Question Let us assume science has demonstrated that vegetarians and careful vegans are just as healthy as – indeed, considerably healthier than – meat-eaters. (It has.) Robert Nozick came up with an interesting hypothetical for those who continue to choose meat in a world where this is so – for those today who opt for the real bacon over the soy bacon not because it’s necessary for one’s health, and not because they bear ill-will towards pigs, but simply because they like the taste more: “Suppose . . . that I enjoy swinging a baseball bat. It happens that in front of the only place to swing it stands a cow. Swinging the bat unfortunately would involve smashing the cow’s head. But I wouldn’t get fun from doing that; the pleasure comes from exercising my muscles, swinging well, and so on. It's unfortunate that as a side effect (not a means) of my doing this, the animal's skull gets smashed. To be sure, I could forego swinging the bat, and instead bend down and touch my toes or do some other exercise. But this wouldn't be as enjoyable as swinging the bat; I won't get as much fun, pleasure, or delight out of it. So the question is: would it be all right for me to swing the bat in order to get the extra pleasure of swinging it as compared to the best available alternative activity that does not involve harming the animal?” It appears to me that Nozick is, if anything, too charitable to modern meat eaters, most of whom pay factory farms to subject animals to sustained, excruciating pain rather than ending their lives with a comparably humane blow to the head. Would any of the meat-eating philosophers in this forum care to explain how their behavior is more justifiable than said bat-swinging?

Accepted:
April 22, 2009

Comments

Thank you for the question. Having taught an animal rights class for many years, I'm embarrassed to admit I'd never run into this argument. I've now tracked it down to this very interesting excerpt from Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia, which I think I'll put on my syllabus. So thank you!

Analogies are both helpful and distracting. Using analogies to explore the ethics of meat-eating is helpful to the extent that people are so accustomed to the practise that many can barely see that it raises an ethical issue. But analogies are distracting as well. We think the bat-swinger acts wrongly. Should we think the same of the meat-eater? Well, only if the bat-swinger is in all morally relevant ways like the meat-eater. But now we have to work hard to see whether that's the case.

I think meat-eaters can rightly say that they're somewhat different. The meat-eater isn't so unfeeling as to have his pleasure while simultaneously watching a cow howl in pain. The dirty-work is done "out of sight, and out of mind." So the analogy might make us think worse of the meat-eater's character than we really should.

Yet I think the analogy does draw us to a correct assessment of the act of meat-eating, if not the character of the meat-eater. Considering that we have equally healthy alternatives, it really is just a certain pleasure we get from meat-eating, at the cost to animals of considerable suffering and death. There are alternative pleasures to be had. Even if inferior, it's hard to believe that the extra pleasure we get from meat-eating really justifies us in imposing so much harm on animals.

You aimed your question at "meat-eating philosophers in this forum," so let me explain: I don't eat meat, but I do eat a little fish, plus "humane" eggs and milk (which aren't really all that humane, if you read about the subject). My diet does cost animals a certain amount of death and suffering. I'm prepared to say I can't justify that, but would make this plea for myself (and meat-eaters). It's much easier to see the wrongness of harming animals for gastronomic pleasure than to change your habits. Eating habits are deep-rooted, in every possible sense, so patience (with yourself, with others) is a virtue here, even more than it usually is.