Topics Knowledge

Question Is it still possible today to consider the notion of "obviousness" as a criterion of truth ?

Accepted:
February 8, 2009

Comments

All arguments seek premises that most people can agree to without needing further support, and in this sense the appeal to what is "obvious" remains alive and well. What people can agree to without further support often depends on the context, however: in the context of a weekend stroll, it may be obvious that there is a goldfinch nearby, whereas in the context of an official birdcount this may be less obvious.

It is more accurate to call obviousness a criterion of knowledge rather than a criterion of truth, since the obviousness of a certain claim may be part of what makes my state a state of knowledge but it is not a part of what makes it true. The fact that a bird ate the seed will be true (or false) regardless of how obvious it is to me. The fact that is is obvious to me may, however, contribute to my view counting as knowledge.

Note that obviousness may be a criterion of knowledge without being either necessary or sufficient for knowledge. Much of what we know (about the movement of the planets, for example) is not obvious, and some things that are obvious (the bend of the stick in the water) are not known.

A closely related term is "self-evident", and many philosophers think that foundational knowledge, such as the knowledge that is given to us in perception, must be self-evident knowledge -- revealing its truth in the very manner of its appearing. Other philosophers, rejecting the idea that knowledge has foundations, deny that there are any self-evident truths.

Question Is it still possible today to consider the notion of "obviousness" as a criterion of truth ? Accepted:February 8, 2009

Question Is it still possible today to consider the notion of "obviousness" as a criterion of truth ?

Accepted:
February 8, 2009