Question Peter Singer has popularized the term "speiciesism." It's the idea that we are biased or prejudiced towards our own species. Therefore, the argument says, we should have equal consideration for animals. However, this won't apply to animals. The lion will still eat the gazelle, the sharks will eat the dolphins, and any carnivore will eat any animal. I can imagine Singer replying that animals don't have the rational capacity to do ethics. The ideas that Singer presents only applies to us humans. But if this is the case, isn't that a form of speciesism?

Accepted:
March 12, 2009

Comments

I don't think your prediction about how Singer would reply is accurate. Start with human meat eating. As a Utilitarian, Singer thinks it's right or wrong in any specific instance depending on whether it maximizes total happiness. Today in western countries (and more and more everywhere), we raise and kill animals in ways that cause them a great deal of misery. We get some pleasure at a result, but looking at the total picture, it's very hard to believe our meat-eating practices maximize total happiness.

Singer does not extrapolate automatically to every single imaginable case of meat-eating. So of course he also doesn't automatically extrapolate to animals. Even if an animal did have the ability to make moral decisions, it's not obvious they'd always be wrong to continue their carnivorous ways. Take a hypothetical lion, Leo, about to eat Gabe the gazelle. Of course, he's not going to do much good for Gabe by eating him, but it could be that he will maximize total happiness. You'd have to think this through with attention to the total ecological picture, to make up your mind.

But now take a case of carnivorous behavior that does seem wrong, if we evaluate it by Utilitarian standards (and continue the pretense that animals can make moral decisions). Sometimes animals kill just for sport, like we do. There's a great segment in the Blue Planet series showing a group of orcas chasing a grey whale and her infant for hours and hours. The mother protects the infant as long as she can. Then the orcas move in for the kill, and don't even bother to take more than a nibble out of the infant. It was just an afternoon's recreation. If you're going to make moral judgments about animal behavior, and use Utilitarian standards to do so, you're most likely going to call this wrong.

But what's the upshot? When we call a human action wrong, we usually follow up by trying to prevent it or punish it. We are in a position to do that. What should we do if orca sport-hunting is wrong? Or if some instances of carnivorous behavior are wrong? Should we send out police boats to patrol the oceans and savannahs? (Should we arrest the orcas, and bring them to justice?)

A Utilitarian like Singer will want to think that through by the same standard as before. Would it maximize total happiness to try to prevent animal wrongdoing in the wild? For a variety of reasons, very likely not (for example, the success rate would be low and the cost high). Then again, if you see one animal inflicting gratuitous cruelty on another right before your eyes (your cat having fun by torturing a bird), then why not step in?

So, getting back to your question--Singer's ideas don't apply only to humans, but the way they apply to issues about wildlife requires careful thought.

You've landed upon what I think of as the reciprocity issue in morals. Do moral agents like us have obligations towards beings that do not or cannot reciprocate?

One thing to keep in mind is that even among human beings we don't require reciprocity. We recognize moral obligations to treat criminals in morally acceptable ways even when those same criminals won't reciprocate. We recognize moral obligations to treat children, the mentally ill, the comatose, and even the dead in morally proper ways even though they can't reciprocate. So, why should it be problematic that humans recognize moral obligations towards non-human animals that can suffer even when those animals are incapable of reciprocating?

One has to, I think, distinguish between beings that I would call "moral agents" from beings that have "moral standing." Beings that are moral agents are beings that are capable of understanding and acting on "moral considerations." Beings that have moral standing are beings to which moral agents give "moral consideration." Singer's point here, as I understand it, is that all beings that suffer should have moral standing, even though not all beings that suffer are moral agents. That's because for Singer while everything that's a moral agent has moral standing, not everything that has moral standing is a moral agent. And note, there's nothing in these definitions that restricts being a moral agent to humans. We might well discover non-humans (natural or supernatural, alien or terrestrial) that are moral agents.

Let's look at an example to see how this plays out. So far as we know, neither a cat nor a mouse are moral agents, but from Singer's position because both can suffer and feel pleasure both have moral standing. Because they have moral standing, moral agents of any sort should take into consideration their suffering and pleasure when making decisions about conduct. That being the case, moreover, it's meaningful to speak about humans treating cats and mice in morally proper and improper ways. On the other hand, since neither cats nor mice are moral agents, we can't expect them to give other beings (including us) moral consideration; and it's not really proper to characterize their behavior as either moral or immoral. So, if a cat should torment simply for its own enjoyment a mouse it catches, its conduct is not moral and not immoral. It makes no sense to characterize the conduct of a being that's not a moral agent in moral terms. But while we can't blame the cat for tormenting the mouse, we can under certain circumstances blame that cat's owner for not removing the mouse from the cat's clutches.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that predation on Singerian grounds should be eliminated entirely. Trying to do so would be impossible without eliminating predators, increasing suffering among the consequentially overpopulated prey, and thereby significantly reducing total well being of the world. Consider the costs, the suffering inflicted, and the pleasures forgone by eliminating, for example, all predatory birds. (Or do you think predation could be eliminated or reduced in a way that would actually increase the total amount of pleasure? The question is, really, an empirical rather than a logical one in Singer's terms.)

You may be interested to know that Singer regards hunting conducted by humans as morally permissible in certain circumstances, or anyway morally preferable to the factory production of meat. He objects to factory farming because the suffering it produces is enormous and unnecessary. Commercial meat production and hunting are both wrong, in Singer's terms, where they are unnecessary or when they inflict unnecessary suffering. Where alternative foods are available, they should be consumed instead. Is it morally defensible, in light of all this, then, to keep carnivores like dogs and cats as pets when doing so requires the factory production of meat? Do the pleasures of keeping domesticated carnivores justify the suffering of animals necessary to produce pet food?

Peter Fosl says "it makes no sense to characterize the conduct of a being that's not a moral agent in moral terms." I wonder about this. If a child's not a moral agent yet, can we not say she does something wrong, though not blameworthy? It's hard to say why that wouldn't be the right way to talk about gratuitously cruel orcas or cats. Of course, using moral labels wouldn't tell us what we ought to do--intervene or not intervene. In many cases, trying to stop animal wrongs ("wrongs"?) will likely do more harm than good.