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Does moral relativism claim that moral statements are descriptive or prescriptive? Anything I read on the topic never seems to make it clear! Surely if it claimed they were descriptive then moral relativism would be nothing more than saying that there is no right and wrong in the sense that we commonly think of it, it actually doesn't matter what we do. But alternatively, how could anyone genuinely believe that moral statements are prescriptive, in such a way that fundamental moral values are dependent on subjective circumstances, e.g. that if I (or my culture) believe murder is right then it is genuinely a good thing for me to do to murder someone? Basically I can't understand the point of the former interpretation and I don't understand how anyone could possibly believe the latter - so what is moral relativism?
Accepted:
December 25, 2008

Comments

Douglas Burnham
January 14, 2009 (changed January 14, 2009) Permalink

It seems to me that you are defining moral relativism as something like 'what is morally correct for me may not be for you', but defining prescriptive as 'statements that demand something from us, universally'. Both seem plausible, but are incompatible, as you point out. But, if we define relativism in terms of a social/ cultural or historical framework, and likewise define what prescriptive means in the terms of that framework, then the incompatibility is not so evident. The statement 'Around here we do things like X' then becomes valid for those around here and indeed prescriptive for those around here. You would not expect it to be either valid or prescriptive for someone from elsewhere; instead, it appears descriptive of how a certain group behave. Clearly, there are plenty of other problems a moral relativist position needs to overcome!

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