Topics Ethics

Question Some actions aren't regarded as morally wrong if their supposed "victim" consented to them. My question concerns whether the important thing is consent itself or, on the contrary, the desire (or the will) for the action. If someone does not consent but we know "beyond any reasonable doubt" that that person wants our action, wouldn't that be the same as if he or she consented? Certainly, if someone wants our action, in most situations he or she will ask for it or accept it, but in some cases this may be impossible (e.g., if that person is unconscious or for some other reason is not able to speak).

Accepted:
December 1, 2008

Comments

There are two separate questions here, one more general and the other more specific. On the general question about whether it is wrong to do something to someone (or for someone?) if they desire it but don't consent to it, I would argue that in most cases it is wrong. One might desire something, but not approve of that desire. For example, Alice might want to have sex with Bob, but because Bob is married, not approve of that desire. In such cases, Alice might not consent to sex with Bob, even if Bob could know full well that Alice desires it. If Bob were to pursue Alice further, knowing of Alice's desire, I think that would be clearly wrong. The general point is that there is more to showing respect for someone than showing respect for their desires, especially if they themselves are critical of their desires.

The more specific question is how we should decide how to act if a person is unable to consent. Your proposal seems to be that we should act on what we know to be the person's desires. But given the worries in the previous paragraph, I think the question: Does P desire that I do A, is not the right question. If the right question is: Does P consent to my doing A, then in cases where the person is unable to express themselves, we should ask: Would P consent to my doing A, if P were able to express her view? If you can answer this "yes," "beyond a reasonable doubt," then I think the action would be permissible.

However, it should be noted also that even if P consents to A, and even if it would be permissible to do A, this does not mean it is the right thing to do, if P's consent is not connected to her desires in the right way. For example, if Bob wants to have sex with Alice and Alice doesn't really want to have sex with him, but consents because, e.g., she is worried that Bob will break up with her if she doesn't, then it would be permissible for Bob to initiate sex, but it is arguable that they shouldn't have sex under these circumstances. This example is intended to show that desire and consent are both relevant in many cases.