Topics Philosophers

Question Hi. This is a question on the nature of Reality, or rather Actuality. I say Actuality, because I like the distinction that Kant makes between Appearances he calls Phenomena, and things in themselves he calls Noumena. Anyway he ends up saying we can never know the thing in itself, i.e. actuality, but only our experience of reality, i.e. appearances. What I would like to clear up is if there is a way to experience the thing in itself, or whether we have to accept on good faith that actuality exists independently of us, and that it stops with I think therefore I am. In short is there an answer to the sceptics? My question has been fueled by the book, _A Beginner's Guide to Reality_, by Jim Baggott, which ends in "it depends on what you believe", which doesn't really do it for me. Cheers, Pasquale

Accepted:
November 11, 2008

Comments

This problem preoccupied many philosophers after Kant. Amongthe easiest to understand alternative view according to which thething-in-itself CAN be 'experienced' is that of Schopenhauer (have alook at section 18 onwards of volume one of The World as Will andRepresentation).

However, sticking simply with Kant, it appears the two alternativepositions you propose ('experiencing the thing in itself', or 'accepton good faith') are not the only possibilities. Indeed, we might saythat these alternatives are pre-Kantian. For example, Hume is ofteninterpreted in this way.

Kant's position is that experience is defined in terms ofappearances, and the notion of experiencing the thing-in-itself isself-contradictory. (There appears to be a difference between'thing-in-itself' and 'noumenon', but we'll pass over that.) On theother hand, what he calls appearances (reality) are precisely whatmost people would call 'actuality'. Appearances ARE 'independent' ofus, in any normal sense of that word. (If a tree falls in the forestand no one was around, does it make a sound? Of course, says theKantian: what sane person would have thought otherwise, other than byquibbling with words?)

If you persisted, asking about things metaphysicallyindependent of us, then things get tricky, as you are aware. Forexample, the concept of 'existence' acquires meaning for us as aconcept of reality, of appearances. So, asking if the thing-in-itselfexists is again self-contradictory, much as if you asked 'what colouris it?, or 'does it like milk with its tea?' Nevertheless, it isstill not a question of taking it on faith, since the thing-in-itselfcannot be absolutely nothing, for then nothing would appear; thething-in-itself IS the thing that appears.

For Kant, the domain of philosophy in which the thing-in-itself issignificant is in ethics. If we are free beings, capable of makingethical decisions, then that freedom can only be noumenal.

By the way: OF COURSE one's beliefs about reality will depend upon one's beliefs; that's tautological. The issue is: are there good reasons for belief. So, doesn't really do it for me, either.