Topics Knowledge

Question Can reflection destroy knowledge? Is it plausible to say that people's sense of social and moral direction can depend on not asking too many questions? Should one always justify conceptual and moral foundations of this world? Do you risk ending up in a situation where the reasons guiding your actions lose their power to guide? By demanding reasons for reasons, can reflection destroy practical knowledge?

Accepted:
August 27, 2008

Comments

I think there can be cases in which reflection can destroy knowledge, yes. Most epistemologists these days are fallibilists, which is to say that one can know something even if what warrants their belief does not guarantee certainty--could be (but is not) mistaken in some way. So one way someone could lose this sort of knowledge would be by reflecting on certain other intuitions most of us have about vulnerability to error. For example, can you really KNOW that something is true if there is even a one in a million chance that you are mistaken in believing that thing? I can easily imagine someone with low enough cognitive self-esteem--"Hey, maybe I'm wrong!!!" or "I'm so stupid, why should I believe that I am getting anything right, even though it really seems in this case I have it right!" and so on--that one could actually talk themselves out of knowing something because one would come up with some reason for thinking they were (or might be) wrong when in fact they had it right all along and had come to the right conclusion in all of the right ways. So, we could potentially "outsmart" ourselves in such a way.

The other parts of your question really raise a different sort of issue, however, which seems to have more to do with one's sense of place in the moral or social realms. Here, too, I agree that it is possible to "outsmart" ourselves by coming up with reasons for thinking that some way we had always done things turns out to be wrong, or at least questionable in a way that makes us feel we are losing our bearings. But I think, given the history of human societies and morals, it is far more likely that taking whatever social and moral direction we have been supplied by our cultures for granted and following a policy of not asking too many questions is much more likely to land us in the wrong place. Good philosophers sometimes do find that what they have believed all their lives--even beliefs fundamental to how thery have lived their lives--do not stand up to critical review. Sure, when this happens, it is as if the ground rolls beneath one's feet and one experiences at least a deep shudder of fear that one might be falling into an abyss. But as scary as it can be, it iss surely better than clinging to what turns out to be folly--or worse, to some moral commitment that is actually groundless and mistaken.

Our moral and social lives affect others in deeply important ways. It is just not good enough to avoid subjecting our beliefs to critical scrutiny, because if what we have been led to believe is mistaken or groundless, it is all too likely that in some way(s) we are wronging and harming others by following paths that should not be followed, and supporting and accepting practices that harm, injure, or create injustice. So even if there is some risk in losing one's sense of place, in critical reasoning, the alternative is to live in a way that risks being unreasonable. This does not merely waste one's own life (as Socrates famously said, "the unexamined life is not worth living"), it is likely to harm others, as well.

I think that challenging ourselves and our reasons for doing and believing what we do is less likely to paralyze us--as your question seems to fear--than to have the effect of slowing us down and prevent us from making snap judgments. But that seems like a pure benefit to me. The effect is almost never that one ceases to find what look like good reasons motivating, as you suggest. Rather, as I have said, it simply makes one a little slower and more thoughtful and circumspect in our review of the reasons available to us--we "put the bar higher" than others do, and so deliberate more deeply before drawing our conclusions. Of course, there are times when we must act, and must judge quickly--but here, our reasons matter less than our characters, for better or for worse. When a little thought is required, good reasoning is always better than making careless or hasty judgments, even if others suppose that the right decision is obvious. (If you have never seen this movie, you should: "Twelve Angry Men," a really perfect case of someone--against lots of hostile resistance--who thinks a little harder and resists others' broad agreement, only to influence everyone involved to come to the right decision.)

Good judgment, in other words, involves a deep and serious respect for reasoning. But it also recognizes that there comes a time when reasoning must end and caction must be taken. One who is forever lost in thought and cannot reach a conclusion to this process is not one who will have the general virtue of good judgment. When we act, we almost always take some degree of risk. But the good judge accepts this and acts when he or she must. So while I take your point that the process of reasoning iss constrained by the requirements of practical wisdom, I would caution very strongly against ever supposing that thoughtless obedience to custom or common practice should ever be preferred to careful critical evaluation.

To know something, I need to believe it. If by over-thinking or thinking unproductively I talk myself into a state of doubt, then I won't know what I formerly knew simply because I no longer believe it. Of course, if the doubts are a sort of passing intellectual vertigo, wemight well say that I really knew whatever it is all along, eventhough I had temporarily put myself out of touch with the angels of my own epistemic better nature.

At least, that's the short story. The long version would get complicated and would best be provided by someone who thinks more about theory of knowledge. (And indeed... I noticed after I submitted my reply that Nicholas Smith had already given a more complkete answer a few minutes before!) But yes: there are such things as over-thinking, analysis paralysis and the like. My sense, however, is that the more common problem runs in the other direction: leaping to dubious conclusions without much of anything in the way of reflection, as Prof. Smith suggests.