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I believe that the taking of human life in all instances (abortion, euthanasia, suicide, self-defence, manslaughter, murder, etc.) is wrong; however under certain conditions I would take life under all these instances and in doing so I would accept that I am wrong and answerable to the Law but I would hope that the Law would be merciful (e.g., in a case of euthanasia where the person involved was terminally ill, in severe pain and no hope of recovery). Is my attitude wrong?
Accepted:
August 17, 2008

Comments

David Brink
August 21, 2008 (changed August 21, 2008) Permalink

It's coherent to say that your action was wrong but that you should be shown mercy and not punished. But I wonder if this is the best way to represent your view. Sometimes we might say something was wrong, meaning only that there was a moral reason against it, but not necessarily a decisive reason. However, usually we (especially moral or legal philosophers) say something is wrong if but only if we mean to say that all things considered one should not do it or that there is a decisive reason not to do it. Wrongness, we might say, is usually a final verdict. (Philosophers would distinguish between prima facie obligations and all things considered obligations and would say that something is wrong if and only if it violates an all things considered, and not merely prima facie, obligation. But that is technical vocabulary that may hinder more than help.) Consider now a distinction from the criminal law between two different sorts of defense -- justification and excuse. When one presents a justification at trial, one challenges whether what one did was in fact wrong, all things considered. By contrast, an excuse concedes wrongdoing but challenges responsibility or culpability for that wrongdoing. So, for instance, someone who kills or injures in self-defense (assuming the aggression was unprovoked and the agent defended herself using proportionate force) is alleging a justification and denying genuine wrongdoing. By contrast, the insane are excused; they committed wrong but were not responsible for it. Mercy may be different from excuse if it does not deny culpability (as excuse does), but, like excuse, it concedes wrong but nonetheless aims to mitigate punishment somehow.

You say that you think that all killing is wrong but that sometimes mercy might be appropriate. That, I think, is a coherent view, but it would be an uncommon view, and I'm not sure it's the right way to represent your ideas. Most people and the law would say that killing is sometimes justified and, hence, not always wrong. Take classic cases of self-defense or the protection of innocent life against an unjust aggressor. There may always be a moral reason not to kill, even in these circumstances, but most people suppose that that moral reason against killing is overridden in such cases and that there is an all things considered justification of killing. If you agree, then you don't really think that killing is always wrong.

So justified killings aren't wrong. But, most people suppose, there are genuine wrongs that are either excused or merit mercy. Excused wrongs tend to be those wrongs for which the agent is not responsible or culpable, as in wrongs committed by the insane. I think it's harder to think of genuine wrongs that are not excused (wholly or in part) that are nonetheless proper objects of mercy. But there may be some. I suppose someone might think that if an agent was guilty of culpable wrongdoing but has suffered psychologically as a result, is extremely remorseful, or has had a spiritual conversion, then he might be an appropriate object of mercy.

Hope these thoughts help.

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