Question The "new" atheist thinkers such as Richard Dawkins tell us that we should dismiss religions and the belief in God, since they are based solely on faith and have no adequate objective evidence for them. If we would follow this line of thought into metaphysics and especially ontology then wouldn't it become also a question of faith. Since there's no objective scientific way to demonstrate any of the arguments about universals or the ultimate building blocks of reality. Is it right to bring this kind of reasoning over from one topic to another and if so does it invalidate something? And if ontology never claimed to be objective in the sense described why anybody even bothered to deal with it.

Accepted:
September 30, 2007

Comments

We need to distinguish between a posteriori and a priori arguments. Empirical sciences such as physics, chemistry and biology are predominantly supported by a posteriori evidence, grounded in experience. By contrast, the 'exact sciences' like mathematics are predominantly supported by a priori demonstration, grounded in the pure intuitions of the intellect alone. Mathematics cannot be based on experience, it might be said, because experience can only ever reveal contingent truths, whereas mathematical speculation gives us an insight into necessity. But both a priori and a posteriori knowledge can jointly be distinguished from faith, which for present purposes we might as well just define as any other basis for belief that cannot be fitted into either of these categories (e.g. the authority of a respected individual or of a text regarded as sacred, or a private inspiration supposedly delivered only to the elect).

Now, there have been many philosophers and theologians over the centuries, and still today, who have felt that, a few 'mysteries' aside, the central core of religious doctrine does not actually depend purely on faith after all, but can in fact be justified either a posteriori or a priori or both. The Intelligent Design argument, for instance, is an example of an a posteriori argument for the existence of a certain kind of creator. The Ontological Argument is an example of an a priori proof of the existence of a perfect being. But there have also been many who have felt that these arguments are fundamentally fallacious, and that ultimately the religious believer does have to fall back on faith after all. (I suppose this would be Dawkins' position -- but it's worth appreciating that many devout believers have criticised one or other of these arguments too).

Now, as for metaphysics, it seems reasonable to suggest that its necessary principles cannot be established a posteriori, in the way that the contingent laws of physics can be. I would just note in passing that, since the work of people like Saul Kripke around 1970, the notion of an a posteriori necessity has become considerably more respectable -- but even Kripke, I think, would accept that such a posteriori necessities cannot be extended to encompass the whole of metaphysics. But, if we do accept that metaphysics cannot be (fully) established a posteriori, does this mean that it must all be just a matter of faith? Not at all, for it might yet be possible to for us establish it a priori, by a method analogous to mathematical reasoning. Indeed, I take it that most metaphysicians would say that this is precisely what they are engaged in doing. They seek to show that some claim about universals (or whatever) must be true, not because of any empirical evidence but rather because all of the alternative hypotheses can be logically shown to lead to formal contradictions.

With these distinctions in place, there are plenty of combinations on the table. (i) One might believe that both a priori and a posteriori arguments are available in religion, bolstered by supplementary doctrines justified by faith, and that a priori arguments (at least) are available in metaphysics. Descartes would be a good example of this position. Or (ii) one might believe that a priori metaphysics is perfectly respectable, but have some misgivings about the possibility of one or other approach to religious knowledge. Several philosophers would fit into this category, depending on how one spells out the details. But note that the basis for thus distinguishing between metaphysics and religion probably would not depend on the natures of their respective subject-matters, so much as on the details of the specific arguments that have historically been proposed in the two domains. One can quite consistently maintain that, although there's nothing incoherent about the notion of proving the existence of God a priori, any more than there's anything incoherent about proving the existence of any other metaphysical entity a priori, the Ontological Argument is nevertheless just a bad argument. Or (iii) one might dismiss both a priori and a posteriori knowledge of religious doctrine, and also dismiss a priori metaphysics. The classic example here would be Hume, who was happy with a priori reasoning in mathematics and with a posteriori reasoning in empirical science, but who rejected everything else. As he famously put it, in the closing words of his Enquiry concerning Human Understanding:

"When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion."