Topics Rationality

Question There are many arguments for the existence of god (e.g., the ontological argument) which, though interesting, probably don't actually account for the religious belief of even their primary exponents. I suspect that a person may be aware of many reasons for belief in a proposition "P" but that only some of these are actually causally linked to his belief that "P"; others he may offer as a way of persuading non-believers, or convincing them of his reasonableness, but these don't actually explain his own conviction. How do we differentiate between arguments or evidence which create belief, and those which merely support it? Is there some link that we perceive between certain reasons and belief but not others?

Accepted:
August 25, 2007

Comments

I am sure you are right that there are certain beliefs that we acquire due to other reasons than reason. Wittgenstein is good on this in his On Certainty where he pokes fun at the idea that our most basic presuppositions could be based on anything at all. Perhaps he sometimes goes too far, since presumably there are situations where one's deepest held belief might be threatened by an argument or some piece of counter evidence. But it also might not. One of the entertaining aspects of listening to the news of the financial markets is the explanation for what is happening. If the markets decline and there is bad economic news these two facts are often linked. But equally often the news is bad and markets rise, and bull markets are defined as taking place when people climb a mountain of worry. There are of course important economic features like optimism or despair which come into play, and which may have little if anything to do with the actual facts on the ground. There are even some market players called contrarians who do the opposite of what everyone else is doing, a bit like some skeptics in ancient Greece who apparently had to be helped out of holes they fell into by their disciples since they tended to doubt the existence of such holes, their only evidence being what they apparently perceived. As skeptics, they systematically distrusted such "evidence".

As philosophers we should not perhaps be that concerned with why people actually believe in things, so much as whether they ought to believe them. My argument here might be designed to impress someone with whom I am having a relationship, but its success or otherwise in this regard is irrelevant to its validity.

It might help to notice that there are distinct senses to "reasons for believing that P." The first sense (usually called "propositional justification" by epistemologists) has to do with there being some fact of the matter that would make it reasonable for me--that would justify me--in believing that P, should I happen to be aware of that fact. Hence, to use an example that has been used by others, the fact that there is smoke billowing out of the house (whether or not anyone is aware of it) is a good reason to think the house is on fire. The other sense is called "doxastic justification" by epistemologists, and has to do with what a person actually has, among his (other) beliefs, as justification for that person's belief that P. So I would be doxastically justified in believing that the house is on fire if I was aware of the smoke billowing out, and was also aware of the connection between smoke and fire.

It is a point of contention among epistemologists precisely what role justification (reasons, arguments, evidence) must play in knowledge and/or reasonable belief. For some, the fact that there is the right sort of causal connection between the knower and the known (even if the knower has nothing we would regard as doxastic justification) is enough. For others, what matters is whether the belief was formed or sustained in ways that reliably produce true beliefs--again, with or without the addition of doxastic justification. Even if we suppose that justification is required, it may well be (and indeed, seems almost certain) that what justifies us is distinct from whatever causes us to have that belief. Doxastic justification is generally understood as consisting in (other) beliefs one has, which provide evidenciary support to the belief they justify. But there are very good reasons to doubt that whatever entities (if they are entities) beliefs are will prove to be able to cause other beliefs. Presumably, the causal story will have to include lots of other entities and processes about which we are not (and perhaps cannot be) aware, in the way we can (at least in principle) be aware of the beliefs that provide doxastic justification for other beliefs we have.