Question I have often wondered how proponents of the doctrine of "historical relativity" manage to avoid an inherent contradiction. For example, if one asserts "all truths are relative" (to an historical epoch or weltenschaung, e.g.), must one not also apply that observation to the "truth" that "all truths are relative?" Which means, of course, that the relativist's position is untenable, because it is itself merely relative and, hence, untrue in a trans-historical sense, at least based upon the relatavist's own assertion. If the only truth that is NOT relative is the relativist's supposed insight, one must ask on what grounds it is exempted. I suppose it might relate to the fact that the relativist stands at the end of Hegelian history, but still, it smacks of inconsistency. Thank you for your time. Sincerely, Charles M. Lansing, MI

Accepted:
July 19, 2007

Comments

I think you raise one of the strongest objections possible to relativism, one so strong that it renders relativism impossible to formulate in that way (i.e., "All truths are relative"). But I do warn you that things get stickier as your get into relativistic theories. What makes them compelling? Here are a couple of general strategies that I've run across.

1. Negative Proof: Negatively, non-relativistic theories of truth seem, at least in the view of many, to have irresolveable problems of their own, arguably greater problems. So, if non-relativistic theories can't be right, some kind of relativism must be correct.

2. Positive Proof: Positively but indirectly, relativism seems (1) to answer serveral questions about the way the meaning of language and the designation "true" is determined and correlatively (2) it seems to be the consequence of investigations into matters concerning topics like whether a body of evidence can determine only one conclusion (answer: no), whether a word can have a single, clear, univocal meaning (nope), whether hypotheses are testable individually (no again), and whether any unique sentence or set of sentences can represent independent reality (no way). Then, of course, there seems to be the facts of sociology and history that exhibit countless and forever changing truth-claims.

3. Shown, Not Said. Some who are influenced by Wittgenstein, might argue that something like relativism can be "shown" by certain manipulations of language usages and certain investigations into the way language works, but it can't be proven. So, if you don't see the relativism, look again, look harder.

4. Biting the Bullet. Some might just embrace the idea that relativism is relative, too. Of course, that would seem to make it impossible for the relativist to criticize absolutists or to assert that absolutism is wrong (after all the absolutists might just say that, "well, absolutism is true for me or for my society, and that's supposed to be enough for you"). But watch it here. The relativist might then try to bring the absolutist to change her or his mind and accept relativism--but NOT by maintaining that relativism is "true" (where there can only be one truth or perhaps where truth is thought somehow to depict "the way things are") but by maintaing that relativism seems to be morally or politically preferable, that it seems more felicitous, the best explanation for our present social purposes, that it seems to work better, that it yields more pleasant consequences, that it produces more agreement, etc.

So, while you're right that relativism of the form you describe hoists itself on its own petard (as Schick & Vaugh like to say) and therefore is self-defeating, don't assume that all relativists would formulate their positions in just that way--at least not without a fuss.