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Can there be such a thing as 'progress' in human history? Does time and circumsance have a more than superficial bearing on our beings? Or are we essentially the same regardless of historical epoch or geographical conditioning? I refer to the so-called 'birth of reason' in 17th century Europe, and its so-said 'dawn of modernity'.
Accepted:
December 24, 2006

Comments

Peter S. Fosl
January 5, 2007 (changed January 5, 2007) Permalink

There can be no simple, unqualified, unequivocal "progress" in human history because what is to count as progress or regress must be determined as such by some measure, some set of criteria for progress. But, so far as I can seen, anyway, there is no unqualified set of criteria to measure by. One can, however, speak meaningfully about specific kinds of progress. For example, one can speak of technological progress in processor speed, or progress in understanding black holes, or in eliminating poverty, or in curing lung cancer, or in reaching the end of a journey, or in gaining financial independence. Mere "progress" itself, however, seems to have little meaning. About whether or not we remain "essentially the same" across space and time, I think the answer depends upon what you mean by "essentially." For myself, I think of people as plastic but not infinitely plastic. Just as one can make many different kinds of things with clay (even an infinite number of different things), one can't make anything. The physics of clay just won't permit everything. Similarly, while many different kinds of human being are possible (even an infinite number of different people), not anything is possible for us.

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Andrew N. Carpenter
January 5, 2007 (changed January 5, 2007) Permalink

I agree with Peter that one need to specify exact criteria for progressbefore making the sort of assessment that you describe. All suchcritiera and assessments will be controversial because our knowledge ofourselves and our histories is limited and controversial, but this byno way means that producing and rationally defending such assessmentsis worthless -- on the contrary, they can be extremely useful andinteresting.

Thepolitical theorist George Kateb provides an interesting--andfascinating--example of how to assess human progress in the modern age.In his recent collection of essays. Patriotism and Other Mistakes(Yale University Press, 2006), Kateb assesses human progresses on thebasis of a richly sophistcated conception of human and argues that theUnited States Constitution represents a significant achievement in thesupport of human dignity, which he defines (again, in a richlysophisticated and fascinating way) in terms of rights-basedindividualism. While Kateb's criteria for progress and assessments arecertainly "qualified" in some of the senses that Peter has described,they are also impressive scholarly achievementsthat provide meaningful insight and information.

Kateb'sdiscussion about ways in which current domestic and foreign policiesand actions of the United States jeporadize this progress is alsoinstructive: human progress is contingent, both in the sense thatwhever progress has occurred need not have occurred and in the sensethat progress we have atained we can lose. So, although I am not at allskeptical about the possibility of crafting useful assessments of humanprogress, I am skeptical that there is a single, inevitable, univocalstory to be told about human progress: there are many possible storiesto be told, with many twists and reversals, and no easy lessons ormorals about human progress simpliciter. So, conceptions of humanprogress as inevitably following one secure path (as, for example, inthe political philosophies of Hegel and Marx and as in some religous texts) aren't plausible.

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