Topics Ethics

Question If one accepts the premise that human beings are, a priori, ends unto themselves, and not means to ends, can any form of economy be considered moral? In communism, the good of the whole outweighs the good of the individual, although one could argue that for the whole to maximize its good, the individual would need to maximize his or her good. In capitalism, I am inclined to say that each individual is treated as an end, and not a means, through the exchange of mutually acceptable value equivalents (money, labor, being the key ingredients). But aren't we also assuming that another person will be a means to our ends (by selling you my goods, I gain energy in the form of whatever you give me, and you gain the goods for a price, each of us thus engaging in a form of means to an end)? Is it moral to allow two people to use each other as means to their own ends, even if they do so freely? And can we even argue that in a free society, persons engaing in commerce do so freely? are they not bounded by the society in which they live? Is it then moral to say that survival within the context of one's life is in itself a moral reason to use another as a means, rather than strictly as an end?

Accepted:
November 22, 2006

Comments

An excellent set of questions. What needs to be clarified first is what does it mean for a person to be an 'end' in themselves? The most common way of defining this, coming from Kant, is roughly as follows. (I am paraphrasing pp. 63ff in the Groundwork.) All actions have ends (sometime translated as ‘purposes’) – that is, all actions have something they are trying to achieve. This end is, in Kant’s language, the ground of the determination of the law of the action. Or, in other words, the end I have in mind makes my action meaningful and indeed tells me what to do in order to reach it. What is merely on the way to the end is a means. Where the end is entirely conditioned by (that is, has worth only through) incentives that may be individual to me, then Kant calls the principle of action ‘material’. Where the end is, however, of such a type that it is posited as valuable independently of any incentive I may have – where it is universality and objectively worthy – then he says the principle of action is ‘formal’. The latter ends alone are moral.

Suppose there were an end in itself, a being that is in its very existence had such objective value. What could this end be? There is only one possibility: rational beings like me. Why? I am a free, rational being and, as such, am the ground of the moral law. The moral law, in other words, is the law I impose upon myself in and through being a free, rational agent. I am an end in myself, therefore, insofar as I am the ground of the law of my action. If I were to treat this ground in me as a means to some other end, then I would have thereby destroyed the very condition of morality. But other persons are likewise free and rational and capable of moral self-determination. Earlier, Kant had written about the respect demanded of me by the moral worth of others. Thus Kant claims that the categorical imperative can be expressed: act so as to treat rational agents, yourself included, always as ends-in-themselves and never as a means to an end.

Right, sorry for the extended exposition. Kant is very careful to argue not that we only treat ourselves and others only as ends, but that we treat them always ‘at the same time’ as ends. This is in accord with the definition I gave about of a material end – something entirely conditioned by my subjective drives. Humans are not and never could be perfect moral beings. So, such an analysis leaves open the possibility of a mixed or impure moral act – one that is grounded simultaneously on material and upon formal ends. The example you give of the exchange of goods, services or monetary instruments is just such a case. What is the difference between an ethically acceptable exchange (one in which I treat the other person as ‘at the same time’ an end in herself), and one that is unacceptable (e.g. selling damaged goods)? In the first case, Kant describes the other person as being able to rationally agree with the real end of my action, and indeed to share in the end of my action. In the second case, the other person not only does not agree or even know the real end of my action, but if they did know, could not rationally agree with it. This notion of the transparent and rational agreement on the ends of action is an explanation of what is meant by the idea of ‘free exchange’.