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Is it possible to 'see' existence (the world) without any bias? Can a lack of bias be considered a bias or just another perpective? Is there a 'true' way to see the world?
Accepted:
November 17, 2006

Comments

Peter Lipton
November 19, 2006 (changed November 19, 2006) Permalink

When we see or otherwise represent the world outside our minds, the act of representation is different from the object being represented. The object represented, say the Eiffel Tower, is something physical, but the act of representation is a thought -- something mental. This difference between that act of represenation and the object being represented might seem to entail that all representation introduces bias. The idea is that the act of representation must introduce something foreign to the object being represented, since the act is different from the object.

But this is a bad argument. Of course there is no thinking without thinking; but it does not follow from this that we can only think about thinking, or that thinking always infects what we are thinking about. Just because the act is mental doesn't mean it represents the object as being mental. A postcard of the Eiffel Tower is flat, but it doesn't represent the Eiffel Tower as flat. Seeing the Eiffel Tower is a mental experience, but we do not see the Eiffel tower as something mental. In that sense, the medium is not the message, and seeing without bias may be possible.

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Douglas Burnham
November 23, 2006 (changed November 23, 2006) Permalink

'Bias' here might mean 'a distortion of thought caused by the nature of thought being something essentially different from what is thought about'. This notion of bias is discussed in Professor Lipton's answer above. However, a related but not identical definition of 'bias' is 'preconceptions; or thoughts that in some way "colour" my presentations of the world'. Thus, we might accuse a judge in a court case of being ‘biased’ if we believe they have preconceptions (attitudes that are in place prior to hearing the specific evidence in the case) about the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Similarly, a political reporter would be ‘biased’ if their existing political beliefs influenced their reporting. In this case, not being biased would mean being objective. Now, it is difficult to be objective in this way, to be sure; also, we might claim that striving for such impartiality is something like a duty for judges and reporters.

However, consider the following admittedly extreme case. I am a reporter for a news agency. I am assigned to cover a particular political story. My personal belief, based upon a rational and careful analysis of the overall political circumstances in my country, is that the current government is corrupt and illegitimate. However, the government also controls the availability of information concerning their own activities, has the most convincing speechwriters and spokespersons, and the opposing political parties are disorganised and weak. Thus, at any given time, such as in the case of the story to which I am assigned, the available evidence for this corruption and illegitimacy is not compelling. So, I could report the story objectively, meaning that I present the evidence and opinions as they are available, and thus give the impression of a competent government. Or, I could report the story objectively, meaning that I present matters as I rationally believe them to be, despite the contingently available ‘evidence’ at the moment. Both of these actions are ‘objective’, in a not dissimilar sense of the word. The first is objective according to the duty imposed upon me by my profession as a journalist; the second is objective according to the duty imposed upon me by my status as a citizen, or as a political or moral agent.

In brief, I have several ‘roles’ – I am a reporter, a private citizen, and a moral agent. I might also be a parent, a supporter of a sports club, an investor in a company, and any number of other roles. None of these roles is in itself a bad thing; none of them necessarily demands of me that I believe in something obviously prejudicial. Nevertheless, the duties of objectivity imposed by different roles might not coincide. Accordingly, even if I present the world without bias according to the constitute rules of one role, I may be ‘biased’ within another. Now, it may be that we are confusing broadly scientific and broadly moral conceptions of 'objectivity'. True, but the example of the journalist shows that these are by no means easy to keep separated (is it the first or second action of the journalist that is more 'scientific'?). So, this line of argument concludes, ‘objectivity’ (seeing the world without bias) is not a state, but is rather a function within a certain type of rule-governed activity.

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