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Logic

How do we get better at reasoning, and what would such an ‘improvement’ be exactly? What sort of benefits would be gained that would distinguish reasoning from some other sort of guide to the truth (whatever that might be)?
Accepted:
February 5, 2007

Comments

Peter S. Fosl
February 24, 2007 (changed February 24, 2007) Permalink

There are broadly speaking four ways we get better at reasoning (narrowly speaking there are countless).

1. We learn to apply existing logical principles more skillfuly, using them in new contexts and using them more effectively in old contexts.

2. We invent or discover new logical principles.

3. We learn to apply existing error theories better so that they help us better understand how and why we go wrong in reasoning.

4. We invent or discover new error theories.

Reasoning might be understood as a set of discursive procedures or rules that make it possible for us to preserve or secure truth. By this I mean that if we begin with a set of truths (even a single truth) reason allows us to proceed to new truths with a significant degree of assurance, perhaps even certainty. Reasoning well means doing this skillfullly in lots of different contexts, in lots of different ways, with lots of different forms of language and thought. It also means understanding how people go wrong so that even though they might start from truths they lose their way and don't end up with truth, or at best end up with truth by luck.

What would be the benefits? Well, the benefits would be the countless benefits associated with getting things right and with acquiring as many truths as possible.

What would set these benefits apart from the benefits of other "guides" to truth? Well, perhaps nothing--assuming one could distiguish these other guides from reasoning in the first place. One might, I suppose, point to revelation or intuition as other guides. If so, one of the benefits of the procedures of reason (or at least of the benefits reason claims for itself) is that of widespread agreement. The procedures of reasoning seem able to produce widespread agreement about the truths they reach. By contrast, the claims of revelation or intuition tend to be much less able to produce agreement among people.

Now, one might say that reason can complement other guides like revelation and intuition in this way: Revelation and intution may provide some of the starting points from which reasoning can determine new truths. Remember that for the most part reason cannot determine the initial truth or truth claims from which it begins. Its starting points must often be given by things like observation, intuition, etc.

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