Question Is the study of "ancient philosophy", (i.e., Socrates, Plato, etc..) just a historical endeavor or is it still an important and fruitful field of philosophical study in itself? Seems to me that much philosophy, even pre-1800 or so, has been made irrelevant through relatively recent scientific studies. (I'm thinking about early philosophy on perception, for example.)

Accepted:
October 19, 2006

Comments

You should tell us which scientific advances in your view have made ancient philosophy irrelevant, and why. Certainly the ancient philosophers used all sorts of science in their accounts which is now thoroughly out of date, and if those accounts depended on the science, then of course it would have serious implications for the philosophy. But on the whole it does not, and that is why we are still interested in ancient philosophy. Certainly we know much more now about how perception actually operates than did our predecessors, but no more at all about how we should classify what we think we experience, and how it should be related to the external world, if at all.

The history of philosophy is studied in philosophy departments forthe purpose of understanding whether a particular philosophical claimis true. To this end, historians of philosophy examine the particulararguments that have been offered for views held in the past, becausearguments, if they are good ones, will imply that their conclusions aretrue. This enterprise is different from the discipline often known as“the history of ideas,” because such a history need not focus on andexamine arguments that people provided for their views. Instead, thehistory of ideas often focuses on questions like— How did thisparticular idea help to legitimize the ruling class or patriarchy? Orhow was this sort of idea attractive to a person who suffered physicalabuse at a young age? Or how did Athenian Imperialism lead to anexposure to Egyptian ideas? These questions are interesting to help toexplain why certain people came to hold particular views, but answersto these questions do not take us much closer to understanding whethera particular view is true.

But, you might reasonably ask, isn’tthe study of the history of philosophy a rather inefficient way ofacquiring philosophical knowledge? To see why this question might seempressing, let’s compare the history of philosophy to the history ofscience. If you look at the history of science, all that you find whenyou go back 2500 years is a bunch of quaint and amusing, butnevertheless, for the most part, false views. By taking a history ofscience course, you’ll learn something about how scientific knowledgeis acquired, but you’ll gain much less in the way of actual scientificknowledge, even if you focus on the reasons ancient scientists offeredfor their views. If you want to gain scientific knowledge, go to thescience departments where they tell you the results of cutting-edge–-i.e., 21st century–- scientific research. Don’t study Thales orAnaximander.

Infact, it might seem that, if it is necessary to study the history ofphilosophy in order to gain philosophical knowledge, then this must bebecause in philosophy, as opposed to science, there is no realprogress-- the views of the ancients are just as plausible as the viewsof the moderns. But if this is right, the worry might continue,philosophy must not be a genuine discipline, in which genuine knowledgecan be gained. For genuine disciplines, like biology, are disciplinesin which progress is made.

I think that progress has been made in philosophy. As a result ofcertain logical innovations, we can now see that certain arguments thatseemed to have been decisive actually turn out to be pretty bad. Theories that seemed plausible in the past now are suspect because theyare incompatible with scientific facts that seem indisputable.

Atthe same time, as Michael Ayers comments in his amazingly good book onLocke (1993): “. . . it is only too easy for progress in one respect tobe matched byregression in another. Or insight can be pushed too far, so thatfashion swings from one paradox to the opposite paradox” (p. 8). Philosophical theories are so abstract, so far removedconceptually from particular experiences, that no particular theory hasany empirical implications. In philosophy, we judge theories primarilyin two different ways: (1) In terms of their coherence with othertheories– philosophical, scientific, and common sense theories--- towhich we are already committed, and (2) in terms of their coherencewith what are often described as our 'philosophical intuitions', ourpre-theoretical judgments about how reality ought to be classified, ourjudgements, for example, about whether a particular action counts asevil, whether a particular entity counts as real, or whether a particular lineof reasoning counts as justified. But coherence with other theoriesthat we hold is not decisive, since these other theories might bewrong– either wholly or in detail. And it is clear that at least manyof our so-called philosophical intuitions are the product of wishfulthinking and bad habits, and so, we can’t rely on them as decisiveeither.

Ithink that it’s important to study the history of philosophy, becauseit’s important to reassess constantly how we got to the place that weare, making the assumptions that we do. We can see certain conceptualdecisions that were made in the past, which perhaps need not have beenmade. Also, since it is difficult on our own to consider all of thephilosophical implications of our individual philosophical commitments,it is useful to see what other thoughtful philosophers have noticed.And finally, as Ayers notes,

“ the past is aninvaluable source of unfashionable truth for those with the sympathy,judgment, and patience to discern it. . . . [I]ts study is perhaps theonly discipline or method by which we can expect to stand above thenon-rational determinants of our own beliefs and concerns, or to callour own deepest presuppositions to account” (p. 9).