Question A question regarding the non-feasibility of political separation of church and State: Remarkably often, philosophers, politicians, and amateur debaters make the statement that a group "must not be permitted to force its religious beliefs upon others" in a nation with separation of church and state. However, for instance, in the United States of America, wouldn't this stance be in direct violation to the concept of majority-rule politics? E.G., In "Democratic government X with church-state seperation": 1.) 51% of voting citizens are "Religion Y" 2.) This group is spiritually opposed to "Concept Z" 3.) The no-or-other-spirituality community is pro-"Concept Z" Doesn't this violate support of separation of church and state? Through majority rule, the agreed system of government, laws would most certainly pass forbidding excercise of Concept Z. However, this clearly violates the legal/spiritual disparity implied in Church/State arguments. How can the ideal of separate church and state be balanced against the implications for splinter or fringe belief groups, in the cases of, for instance, theft, murder, sexual errancy, or any other religiously proscribed behaviours? If a religious group supports wanton anarchy, what right would a truly Church/State separate government have to control such behavior - as an absolute concept, this seems to fail, it would seem to me that a system of proscription that fails in absolutes should not be executed even on a limited basis. What do you think? -Alex N. Germany

Accepted:
October 12, 2006

Comments

A really excellent question about some especially thorny issues. I'm not an expert in constitutional law, and so I would advise searching US supreme court and federal court decisions relevant to these issues. For myself, I would at present answer thus: Yes, the doctrine of "separation of church and state" does violate the principle of majority-rule. (The phrase was first used by Thomas Jefferson in an 1802 letter to Danbury, CT, Baptists: "I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between church and state.")

But that this separation limits majority rule is a good thing and something necessary for the realization of a democratic society. Democracy is not simply a matter of majority rule. If it were, the majority would be able to abuse minorities. Majority rule might, for example, legitimate the enslavement of a minority. Majority rule must therefore be limited by stipulating various rights that serve as boundaries, beyond which the will of the majority cannot prevail. This is the function of the Bill of Rights and subsequent amendments of the US Constitution. So, even if 99% of the population believes Religion Y, it cannot prohibit Religion Z. Except-----

Except, as you say, to the extent that the rights of religious expression must be balanced against other rights as well as what might be described as compelling interests of the state. This balance is difficult to achieve, and it remains in flux. You are right, of course, that balancing these competing rights does entail the state limiting religious expression and conduct.

One issue that's particularly live today is a controversy concerning the rights of the parents of members of certain religions to make decisions on behalf of their children--especially decisions with grave consequences. Many Christian Scientists, for example, as a matter of religious conviction, refuse standard medical treatment. Many Jehovah's Witnesses, as a matter of religious conviction, refuse blood transfusions. Now, for competent aduts to refuse medical treatment for themselves is one thing. But it's quite another to refuse it for their children. It's my impression that the state has inclined more and more to assert that it possesses a compelling interest in protecting the well being of children that overrules the rights of members of Christian Scientists and Jehovah's Witnesses to refuse medical treatment for their children--at least when there is sound reason to think that without treatment the children will suffer serious injury or death. I think the state is right in doing so.

But where does one draw the line? Should Jews (and others) be prevented from circumcising their sons? Should African immigrants be prevented from circumcising their daughters? Should Christian parents be prevented from scarring their children psychologically with frightening threats of damnation? It seems that we incline to permit parents to injure their children in not-serious ways. But where's the line between serious and non-serious injury. I think a line ought to be drawn, but I also think we should expect it to move a bit.

In general, I think the philosophical principle should be that state interference with religion ought to be minimized and that religious liberty ought to be maximally permitted, the maximum defined by the point at which the exercise of religion interferes with or violates or erodes the rights of others--a point likely to face continued revision.

Note that according to this principle, state action with regard to religion should only be negative. That is, the state should only limit religion, and do so only when it threatens to violate others' rights. The state should never positively promote religion. (Of course, what's to count as promoting is notoriously difficult.)

With regard to the "wall of separation of church and state," perhaps Jefferson should have said that the wall should be maximally high but should include a small, difficult-to-open door though which the state can pass to restrain religion when it threatens to engage in serious mischief. And that door should only open from one side, the side of the state. Armed guards should be stationed to make sure religion doesn't slip into the state's domain and work its mischief there, as well. If religion wishes to limit the state (and sometimes I think it should), it ought to do so by persuading citizens outside of the apparatuses of government.