Topics Happiness

Question My question pertains to the idea of happiness being induced by a drug. If the drug--like modern anti-depressants--actually changes a person's neurochemistry such that for all intents and purposes the brain looks just like a "happy" brain, then wouldn't you consider that person happy? (Would you give a different answer for a drug like Ecstasy that alters the brain in slightly different ways than classic neurochemical happiness but still brings about a perception of happiness?) And what about the perception of happiness over the long haul? If someone is on anti-depressants for, say, fifty years, and has an over-all sense of peace, purpose, etc that they would NOT have otherwise had, have they, in fact, been happy?

Accepted:
August 26, 2006

Comments

The answer to your question depends on the concept of happiness. Two common assumptions about happiness are (a) that happiness is a good -- according to hedonism, the only good -- and (b) that happiness is subjective. But these two assumptions are in tension.

Consider (b). Some people treat happiness as an essentially subjective condition, akin to contentment. If we accept such a view, several other claims seem to follow. It looks like happiness is a matter of being in a certain subjective state and doesn't depend upon how this state is caused -- its sources or etiology. Its likely that this sort of contentment is dependent on brain chemistry, as any mental state presumably is. For any given individual there may be multiple brain states and processes that would produce contentment, and which brain states and processes produce pleasure may vary among individuals or across species. It also seems like contenment is something the subject ought to be authoritatiave about. If so, one can't be mistaken about whether one is happy.

But (a) and (b) may conflict. In Anarchy, State, and Utopia Robert Nozick famously discusses an Experience Machine.

Suppose there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desire. Superduper neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your life's experiences?

Nozick answers No, claiming that we value being certain kinds of people and doing certin sorts of things and not merely having experiences as if we were such persons or doing such things. He concludes that value cannot consist in psychological states alone, as hedonism, for example, implies. If happiness is understood in subjective terms, such as contentment, it seems to follow that happiness cannot be the only or the most important good. So, if we insist on (b), we might conclude -- So much the worse for happiness.

Alternatively, we might appeal to the tension between (a) and (b) to question (b). If we assume that happiness is an important good, then we might question whether happiness is or must be essentially subjective. Consider the case of the Deluded School Boy who desperately wants to be the most popular boy in school -- it's his all consuming desire. His classmates despise him. A measure of their contempt for him is that, knowing his greatest hope, they contrive to make him think he is the most popular boy in school by electing him Class President, all the while ridiculing him behind his back. Because the hoax is successful, the Deluded School Boy is euphoric. Of course, his euphoria is based on a false belief. Observers, who are aware of the hoax, might deny that he was really happy despite being euphoric or might describe his state as one of false happiness. Were the School Boy to later uncover the hoax, we could understand if he were deny that his euphoria was genuine happiness or if he described that euphoric period as a period of unhappiness or false happiness. To the extent that we can understand these reactions, we can formulate more objective conceptions of happiness that require that genuine happiness be grounded in certain activities and relationships that are worth wanting and pursuing. In this way, assumptions about the value of happiness may make us reconsider the assumption that it is essentially subjective.

(My discussion of the Deluded School Boy is adapted from an example in Richard Kraut's "Two Conceptions of Happiness" Philosophical Review 88 (1979), pp. 176-96. Kraut's article is a very nice discussion of the continuity between ancient and modern conceptions of happiness, in which he defends the coherence of more objective conceptions of happiness of the sort embodied in some ancient conceptions of eudaimonia.)

For the reasons that David offers, I agree that subjective feelingsof contentment are not sufficient for well-being: one couldfeel good and not be doing very well. At the same time, I would notconclude (not that David suggests otherwise) either that (1) positivefeelings of contentment are not necessary for well-being orthat (2) the fact that someone’s feeling of contentment was induced bydrugs (anti-depressants, ecstasy) by itself undermines that person’sclaim to well-being.

Individuals who are suffering from depression notonly are suffering a loss of good feeling; in addition, they often havea difficult time motivating themselves to form and sustain significantrelationships, to gain a deeper understanding of the world, toappreciate beauty, etc. In other words, without a subjective feeling ofcontentment, humans are often unable to engage in the sorts ofactivities that objectivists about well-being tend to associate with a genuinely goodlife.

Additionally, if I were to learn that someone had been on anti-depressantsfor fifty years, had lived a life of contentment, and alsohad formed and sustained significant relationships, had a significantpositive impact on the world, had thought deeply and well about theworld and her place in it, etc., I would not conclude that herwell-being was fake. She really did succeed in living a good life,because she really did manage to engage in activities that hadsignificant value. The fact that this achievement was made possiblethrough her fortunate access to anti-depressants is to my mindirrelevant. Incontrast, if I were to learn that a person’s drug-use prevented himfrom engaging in objectively worthwhile activities, then I wouldconclude that, although the drugs gave him the illusion that he wasdoing well, as a matter of fact, he was not. As a matter of fact, hewas not doing well, because, as a matter of fact, he did nothingworthwhile.