Topics Ethics

Question Can I use someone else as a "mere means" in Kant's words without coercing or deceiving them? Is the use of someone as mere means possible when there is consent? Some of the examples I have in mind are: (1) Prostitutes sell their bodies, hence "objectify" themselves even though they consent to this action. We could consider two sub-cases, one in which a prostitute is forced to prostitution due to poverty, the other in which she or he has other options. (2) Two people, even though they don't like each other, meet regularly to play tennis. The only reason they meet is to play tennis. In short, they "use" each other to play tennis.

Accepted:
May 30, 2006

Comments

There are obviously different readings of Kant's relevant texts as well as different views on what is the systematically most plausible interpretation of his phrase. With this caution, let me give it a try.

Treating someone as a mere means contrasts with treating her or him also as an end in itself, as a person whose dignity and whose permissible ends have conduct-guiding importance. This suggests that we need to describe your two cases in a bit more detail.

One more detailed description might depict tennis player A as wholly indifferent to B's dignity and to the fulfillment or otherwise of B's permissible ends. Here A helps fulfill B's end of playing a good game of tennis, but only because this serves A's own end to do the same. Should A come across an opportunity to take advantage of B (ridiculing B in public to good effect, exploiting a financial emergency, etc.), A would readily do this so long as A is confident of finding a comparable substitute partner in the event that B no longer wants to play with A. Should B become incapacitated by a stroke, A would see no reason to call or visit B in hospital or to offer help and consolation in other ways -- B would lose all value and interest for A if B became unavailable for tennis matches. Here A is truly using B as a mere means.

Another more detailed description depicts A as caring about B's dignity and the fulfillment B's permissible ends. To be sure, A does not like B (as you stipulate). But A would never ridicule B in public to score points with third parties, nor would A exploit B's sudden financial emergency. If B were to suffer an incapacitating stroke, A would offer help and consolation to help B adjust to B's new condition and environment. Here A is not using B as a mere means.

Note, in the foregoing, several examples of treating someone else as a mere means that do not involve coercion or deception -- exposing another to public ridicule, taking advantage of another's financial emergency or predicament, being wholly indifferent to another's need for help and consolation.

In the prostitution case, it sounds a bit as though you are also concerned with the prostitute treating herself (her own body) as a mere means. But, as your main question concerns so treating "someone else," I leave this issue aside to focus on whether someone hiring a prostitute is treating her as a mere means. Again, I would think this depends on his attitude to her. Does he think and care about her dignity and feelings? Is he concerned to make their encounter bearable and unhumiliating? Would he be ready to let her keep payment for a service not performed if he thought that she urgently needs the money but would be deeply distressed by performing? If the answers are affirmative, the client is not using the prostitute as a mere means.

One noteworthy feature of the interpretation I have sketched is that the relevant judgment does not depend on observable conduct alone. It may depend on how the relevant agent is disposed to act in hypothetical scenarios (such as B's stroke or the prostitute's distress) which may never actually arise. This fits with Kant's focus on assessing agents' maxims, which may not be fully revealed in their observable conduct.