Topics Freedom

Question My question concerns existentialism and determinism. I understand that a "movement" like existentialism is very nebulous and diverse. Many of the thinkers given the name "existentialist" hold varying views on various subjects. But one theme, at least as I understand it, that runs through many existentialist works is the idea of freedom, Sartre's "condemned to be free" for example. From what I understand the sum of an individual is composed of their actions, we are what we do. As such we have a responsibility towards our actions. But I was wondering how some of the major existentialist thinkers would address determinism, specifically determinism based on scientific physical laws. It would seem that if this type of determinism were correct, it would undermine the existentialist view of freedom.

Accepted:
May 2, 2006

Comments

By emphasizing human freedom and responsibility, existentialists are not asserting a claim in physics -- such as "it is false that human beings are mechanisms fully determined pursuant to physical laws of nature."

Rather existentialists are making two different points. One is phenomenological. We are condemned to be free or forced to decide. You must decide whether to enlist in the army, whether to pull the trigger, and so on. Physical determinism, even if you could somehow know that it's true, could not take away this predicament of being forced to choose.

The other is a normative point about how we ought to think about our decisions and agency. I ought to take full responsibility for the effects of my decisions. And when there is the slightest doubt about the reach of these effects, I ought to assume that this reach is greater rather than smaller.

Existentialists urge this point retrospectively: I ought not to deflect responsibility by thinking/saying that things just happened ("I could not bring myself to act differently"). And they also, and especially, urge it prospectively: I must lead my life on the practical assumption that it is up to me to change the world, that the whole future of humankind is my responsibility.

This practical instruction, too, is not much disturbed by physical determinism. For suppose again that physical determinism is true and you know this. You might then appeal to it to deny your responsibility ("if I shoot, I will have nothing to do with this man's death, it's all just molecules interacting according to immutable laws"). But you might also accept responsibility ("if I shoot, then I will be the cause of this man's death.") Here the second point touches the first: You are still confronted with the choice between these two attitudes.