Question 'Nature' is commonly understood as, among other things, standing in contrast to the 'man-made'. However, can these two ideas be kept separate? Surely everything 'man-made' cannot occur contrary to the fundamental structure of the universe and does not oppose it, but rather occurs within it and perhaps even as a factor of the natural constitution of humankind? Or to put it more simply: surely there is nothing 'unnatural' about (for example) a parent deciding upon the genetic make-up of their as yet unborn child, despite this being to many peoples' distaste.

Accepted:
March 10, 2006

Comments

'Nature' is a difficult concept, with a long and varied history. Thus, whenever someone comes up with an argument that something is ‘natural’ or ‘un-natural’, the first question that should be asked is ‘what do they mean by ‘nature’, and how can this concept of nature be justified?’

Broadly speaking (very broadly) there are two conceptions. First, nature as ‘of this world’, and thus as opposed to ‘supernatural’ (for example, pertaining to God). Under this conception, human activity would generally count as natural, along with rat-behaviour, tulip-behaviour, and granite-behaviour. However, if we take away the possibility of the supernatural (if we argue that, at least for these purposes, we can discount the realm of the divine), then natural is everything, and thus doesn’t really have much meaning at all. Second, nature is the world insofar as human beings do not interfere; as opposed to, say, ‘culture’. It is this second meaning that would be in use in the kind of argument about genetic choice that you cite. What does this distinction mean? One way of understanding it, which is to be found in Aristotle and Kant among others, is that the human domain consists of activity organised by conceptions of purpose. So, both a dog and a human can chase a ball, but in the case of the latter there is (or might be) a conscious purpose (to stop the ball rolling over the boundary for four points, in cricket, for example). But then the question is, can this nature/ culture distinction really be maintained? Can we really show that a dog has no purposeful conceptions; can we really be sure that all human action does?

Anyway, these are some of the issues. My basic point is that talking about ‘nature’ says and proves nothing until the above issues are at least provisionally resolved.