Topics Ethics

Question I've been reading some encyclopedia articles on utilitarianism. As far as I can see, utilitarians have moved from (the defence of) the pursuit of happiness to the pursuit of preference satisfaction. A preference is satisfied, I suppose, when someone gets what she or he wants. Now, I think it's reasonable that we ought to try to make people happy, at least in most cases, but I don't think it as reasonable that we ought to try to give people what they want. And anyway, I think that these are two very different ethical theories. Should we call both "utilitarianism"?

Accepted:
February 17, 2006

Comments

There are different forms of utilitarianism, and they have different names. The view that we should aim at the best balance of happiness over unhappiness is often called hedonistic utilitarianism. The view that we should aim at the best balance of desires or preferences being satisfied over desires or preferences being unsatisfied is often called preference utilitarianism. They are both considered forms of utilitarianism because they claim that achieving the best balance of something, either happiness over unhappiness, or desires being satisfied over desires being unsatisfied, is the ultimate criterion for judging the moral rightness or wrongness of an action.

Philosophers moved from hedonistic utilitarianism to preference utilitarianism because of the difficulty of coming up with an objective account of happiness, or even one that commanded anything close to universal assent. It was thought that desires or preferences being satisfied was a more objective criterion, and also one that was more tolerant. No one could impose their own concept of happiness on others, and correctly claim that they were doing the morally right action.

However you are right that "it's reasonable that we ought to try to make people happy, at least in most cases, but I don't think it as reasonable that we ought to try to give people what they want." Notice that the view you are putting forward is not hedonistic utilitarianism, for you say "at least in most cases" not "always." Also you do not say that this should be the only or ultimate aim of all of our actions. But on any ordinary view of happiness it does seem that it's reasonable that we ought to try to make people happy, at least in most cases.

The second part of what you say, "I don't think it as reasonable that we ought to try to give people what they want," is also correct. Failure to appreciate that point is why as a theory, preference utilitarianism has more rhetorical than philosophical force. Given that the preference utilitarian does not put any limits on the content of desires, (this tolerance is part of its appeal) it seems to hold that one ought to satisfy the desires of a mentally ill person for the most painful possible death, if this does not result in a worse balance of overall satisfaction of desires.

All Utilitarians share the view that we ought to assess the morality of actions in terms of how they affect the well-being of those whom they affect. They often differ in their conception of well-being. Some regard well-being as a matter of pleasure and the absence of pain; others have different conceptions of well-being. I don’t know of any philosopher who has suggested that happiness is simply a matter of satisfying whatever desires we might happen to have. (Callicles appears to endorse this view in Plato’s Gorgias; but Plato makes clear that Callicles was not a philosopher.) Instead, the only desire-satisfaction accounts that have any serious defenders are accounts that put certain constraints on the desires the satisfaction of which would constitute well-being. In the end, I don’t think that any version of this sort of account is viable, but I also don’t believe that such accounts can be easily dismissed. For able defenses of informed desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being, see Richard B. Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); James Griffin, Well-Being (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); and Peter Railton, “Facts and Values,” Philosophical Topics 14 (1986).