Question Even though it has been strongly argued that divine foreknowledge doesn't negate free will, allow me to ask the question another way. How could God know our decisions if they are truly free? To know the outcome of something is to imply contingency (and determinism). To put it another way, if a third party can know the nature of an individual then that individual cannot be the author of his nature.

Accepted:
December 5, 2005

Comments

The question seems to imply that 'true freedom' requires that agents must be the author of their own natures, and if one is the author of one's own nature, then no being--not even God--could predict how a truly free agent would act.

The assumption that one needs to be the author of one's own nature in order to be free seems to be too strong, however, for it implies that only God can be free, because only God is traditionally conceived to be the author of His own nature.

Suppose that one drops the requirement that a free agent must be the author of his/her own nature, and weakens it to the requirement that a free agent must be the author of his/her own choices. Then, the worry goes, if an agent is indeed the author of his/her own choices, then those choices cannot be foreseen.

The assumption that God could not foreknow the actions of a truly free agent is extraordinarily problematic, for it would compromise God's omniscience, and hence would be rejected by most believers. Nevertheless, the question remains: how can divine foreknowledge be reconciled with true freedom?

One has two options here. First, one can reject the conception of freedom that is being assumed here.

Even if in order to be free, an agent must be the author of his/her own choices, this need not preclude that one's choices may also be determined by preceding events. It all depends on one's conception of authority. For example, one could be the author of one's choices if one's choices depend on one's reasons, even if one's reasons do not depend on oneself. Presumably, however, the questioner would reject this conception of authority, maintaining that only if choices depend entirely on an agent can those choices be free.

Yet even such a conception of freedom--a variant of libertarianism--need not imply that God cannot foreknow such a free agent's choices. Indeed, one historical account of freedom--the Molinist account of freedom--was designed so as to preserve an agent's determination of his/her own choices, while nevertheless allowing for divine foreknowledge.

So true freedom need not preclude the possibility of divine foreknowledge.

The compatibility or incompatibility of divine omniscience and mortal freedom interests me a lot, although the concept of the "author of one's own nature" strikes me as relatively unclear and probably not that useful for investigating this.

Sean sketches out one answer that may be satisfactory to those who believe that free will is compatible with all of one's choices being determined by preceding events. I'm not sympathetic toward this sort of "compatibilism," and I've never been persuaded by any argument that free will could exist a world where there could be an omniscient God. So, my short answer to your question is that I think that omniscience does negate free will.

(My own position is an unpopular one, and as Sean suggests a lot depends on exactly how you define the key terms used in the original question and in the answer that I just gave....)