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Abortion

Is there a moral difference between killing a newly born baby and having an abortion? To be consistent, do we have to say either abortion/infanticide is morally wrong OR that abortion/killing a newborn can be morally permitted if the circumstances are right?
Accepted:
November 15, 2005

Comments

Matthew Silverstein
November 15, 2005 (changed November 15, 2005) Permalink

The answer to your question depends in part on whether and how the moral status of a fetus differs from the moral status of an infant. One might reasonably think, for example, that there is no significant difference in moral status between a fetus the day before its born and an infant the day after its born. The only difference seems to be one of residence: one resides inside a uterus, and the other resides in a hospital's maternity ward. And we don't normally think that where one lives is especially relevant to one's moral status. Thus, if it's wrong to kill one, it must be wrong to kill the other. That said, one might also reasonably think that there is a significant difference in moral status between an embryo that is only two weeks old--a cluster of cells that looks something like this--and a newborn baby. And if there is a significant difference in moral status, then it is perfectly consistent on one hand to defend the right to have early-term abortions but on the other to oppose infanticide.

Of course, questions about the moral status of an embryo or fetus are in many ways the locus of ethical questions about abortion in general. (They do not play as central a role in the legal debates about whether laws banning abortion are constitutional.) Other questions might also be relevant to the ethical debate, though. Some philosophers--most notably Judith Jarvis Thomson--have argued that abortion is not always wrong even if the fetus has the same moral status as an infant. These philosophers often appeal to a woman's reproductive rights--her right to control her own body and to control whether or not she will become a mother--in order to defend the right to abortion. Thomson's rights-based defense of abortion is available online here.

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Andrew N. Carpenter
December 9, 2005 (changed December 9, 2005) Permalink

The view that Matthew articulates--that the moment of birth is not morally significant in a way affects deeply the moral status of the newborn infant--is a popular one, but it has been challenged by some. For example, the feminist philosopher Mary Anne Warren argues that birth is morally significant in virtue of the newborn's expanded social relationships.

To say that newborns have a different moral status than nearly-borns does not mean that late-term fetuses ought not to be protected from harm -- but Warren's line of thought might provide a philosophical basis for concluding that newborn infants and late-term fetuses are not entitled to exactly the same degree of legal protection.

To answer your question more directly: If there is a substantive question about whether newborns and late-term fetuses have significantly different moral status, there is even a stronger case to be made that there are big differences in the moral status between newborns and fetuses that can be legally aborted. If this is correct, killing a newborn and using abortion to kill, say, a first-trimester fetus may well be morally different.

Finally, for more on Warren's view see her essay "The Moral Signficance of Birth."

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