Topics Philosophy

Question If philosophy is engaged in a hunt for eternal verities, why does it so often seem as faddish as a clique-obsessed 13 year-old? For instance, in the 1920s logical positivism ruled and their answers seemed on the mark -- until, of course, everybody realized the Vienna Circle was engaged in narrow-minded bilge. Then it was Ordinary Language philosophy -- good on J. L. Austin and Gilbert Ryle -- until of course folks realized that close study of ordinary language revealed little of interest and certainly no grand metaphysical truths. Then it was the Gang of Quine (to be is to be the value of a bound variable) which seemed to have the handle on reality in the 1960s and 1970s -- but does anyone today still recall why anyone thought Quine's work mattered? Where are the eternal truths? Does no one in today's philosophy pursue work designed to last?

Accepted:
October 25, 2005

Comments

My own view is that there is something of value in all of that work, more so in Quine's than in Austin's or Carnap's, but that's just my own view. I believe, in fact, that Quine's work will continue to be taken seriously for a longtime, in part because of its intensely naturalistic focus and in part because of its historical significance within the evolution of philosophical thought in the US. But even if we waive these points, the last question seems to presuppose something about the people mentioned earlier that isn't in evidence, namely: That the positivists, the ordinary language philosophers, and Quine and his accomplices weren't pursuing work that would last. They plainly were. If they failed, well, pretty much everyone has.

It's easy to look back at the history of philosophy and think, man, there sure were some great philosophers then. Where are they all now? But the so-called modern period, from Descartes through Kant, spans a couple hundred years, and the canon picks out but six or seven people from what was a great sea of philosophers. Historians of the period would be able to explain in some detail that plenty of bad philosophy got done then, and there were plenty of "fads" that came and went. What seems important to us now isn't always what seemed important then, and it's hard to know what work being done now will seem important later. But if one looks at the past hundred years of so of philosophy in the English-speaking world, surely there are a handful of writers whose work stands out as of potentially lasting significance. People will disagree, to be sure, whose work should be so described. But, even without attaching specific names, it seems to me that there can be little doubt that the twentieth century witnessed a profound revolution in the way we understand the mind, and philosophers played a significant role.

So, if one looks at the matter realistically, I'm far from sure the record of the last century is at all poor.

I'm inclined to think that what leads the questioner to worry about the changing estimation of particular philosophical approaches in the twentieth century is that s/he seems to think that the fact that philosophy is engaged in the hunt for eternal verities should imply that philosophical approaches (and maybe even philosophical questions) themselves are not historically situated.

To be sure, philosophers seek to give reasons for their claims, and thereby to resolve philosophical problems. But what philosophical problems appear important, and what methods seem appropriate for resolving those problems, certainly change over time. Certain questions that were important for medieval philosophers--e.g., 'How many angels can fit on the head of a pin?' which actually had some relevance for medieval theories of place or space--seem ridiculous to certain philosophers today. Certain methods for resolving philosophical questions--e.g., the Rationalists' appeal to a pure intellect that could operate independently of the senses and yield substantial metaphysical truths--now also seem ridiculous.

The rise and fall of certain 20th century approaches to philosophy seems no different than these other shifts.