Topics Freedom

Question Of the many strong arguments against free will, I find the following to be the most convincing. Some theorists have suggested that free will seems to require one to be responsible for the way one is, "mentally speaking." For example, in order to be responsible for my decisions, I must have chosen, in a conscious way, to be in the particular mental state I was in at the time of my choice. Hence, free will seems to require preconsciousness; but this can be pushed into an infinite regress. Do you know of any possible answers concerning this argument?

Accepted:
November 24, 2005

Comments

The obvious response is that this premise

...[I]n order to be responsible for my decisions, I must have chosen, in aconscious way, to be in the particular mental state I was in at thetime of my choice.

is one we have little reason to believe. I don't see any particular reason to suppose I should bear no responsibility for my current decisions even if my current mental state was determined by causes outside my control. Perhaps one wants to say I'm not "ultimately" responsible, but then the question is why free will should require "ultimate" responsibility in that sense. These kinds of arguments often trade upon this kind of ambiguity.